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SUMMARY
Telecommunication systems have evolved significantly since their inception
and the recent convergence of telephony infrastructure allows users to communicate
through a variety of ways including landlines, mobile phones and Voice over IP (VoIP)
phones. While cellular and public switched telephone (PSTN) networks use Caller ID
to identify users, VoIP networks employ user ids, similar to email, to identify users.
However, in all these networks this identity is locally asserted and is therefore easily
manipulated. It is easiest to assert any identity within IP networks and this has
resulted in VoIP spam (e.g., the recent Skype Computer Repair spam calls). As IP
networks converge with other PSTN and cellular networks, it has also become easy
to assert any Caller ID across these networks. The larger issue of Caller-ID spoofing
has increasingly contributed to credit card fraud and identity theft. To address this,
we introduce the notion of effective identity which is a combination of mechanisms
to (1) establish identity of the caller that is harder to manipulate, and (2) provide
additional information about the caller when necessary.
In this dissertation, we first look at the specific issue of determining the legiti-
macy (additional information) of a user id within IP networks to address the VoIP
spam problem. We propose CallRank, a novel mechanism built around call duration
and social network linkages to differentiate between a legitimate user and a spam-
mer. We realize that any system that determines the legitimacy of users based on
their social network linkages leaks private information. To address this, we create a to-
ken/credential framework that allows a user to prove the existence of a social network
path between him/her and the user he/she is trying to initiate contact with, without
actually revealing the path. We combine the privacy properties of two techniques in
xiv
cryptography: Delegatable Anonymous Credentials (DAC) and E-Cash to create this
framework. We then look at the broader issue of determining identity across the en-
tire telecommunication landscape to address the issue of Caller ID spoofing. Towards
this, we develop PinDr0p, a technique to determine the provenance of a call - the
source and the path taken by a call. In particular, we show that the codec transfor-
mations applied by multiple intermediary networks, in combination with packet loss
and noise characteristics, allow us to develop profiles for various call sources based
solely on features extracted from the received audio. In the absence of any verifiable
metadata, these profiles offer a means of developing specific fingerprints that help
uniquely identify a call source. We show that the audio can also provide valuable
additional information. We use anomalies in timbre created by different undersea
telecommunication cables to develop London Calling, a mechanism to identify geog-
raphy of a caller. Together, the contributions made in this dissertation create effective





Telecommunications has evolved significantly since its inception in the 1800s to a
thriving $4 trillion sector in 2010. The current telecommunication infrastructure al-
lows users to communicate using a variety of technologies. Circuit switched landlines,
which operate on Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN), continue to provide
telephony to the majority of homes and businesses. Mobile phones now offer service
to more than four billion users [161]. Voice over IP (VoIP) allows users to inexpen-
sively communicate with each other irrespective of the geographical distances, with
systems such as Skype [27] currently serving over 400 million users [25].
One fundamental question in a telecommunication system is when a person re-
ceives a call, should he answer it. Two aspects governing this decision are: (1) the
identity of the caller, and (2) associated information about the caller. If a call recip-
ient knows the caller, then it is easy for him to determine whether or not to take a
call. Unfortunately, in telecommunication networks identity has always been locally
asserted. In VoIP, user ids are self picked. In PSTN and cellular networks, identity is
provided by Caller ID which is volunteered by the calling side. Further complicating
this situation is that people often receive calls from people they do not know and
yet it is important for them to answer that call. For example, consider a call from a
friend of one’s parent who is visiting the city and needs someone to show him around.
In such cases, identity is not sufficient and the recipient needs additional informa-
tion about the source of a call. We define effective identity to be a combination of
provided credentials and inferred feature values about a particular caller that helps a
call recipient determine if that call will result in a desirable interaction.
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The lack of such effective identities in telecommunication networks has made it
vulnerable to easy attacks. Within VoIP systems, since user ids are self picked, call
spam attacks have emerged where attackers have created accounts claiming to be
well established computer repair shops. The introduction of VoIP has also eroded
much of the trust associated with traditional telephony, making it easy to claim any
Caller-ID, resulting in Caller ID spoofing attacks. Caller ID spoofing has contributed
significantly to credit card fraud, identity theft and disruption of 911 services. For
example, in 2009, a single criminal ring used Caller-ID spoofing to steal close to 15
million dollars.
1.1 Dissertation Contribution
Creating effective identities in telecommunication networks has several challenges.
First, from a call recipient’s perspective, we need to identify which calls require only
identity and which need effective identities to ensure that the call results in a desirable
interaction. Second, we need to identify what additional information is useful in
making effective identities. Third, since call interactions are extremely personal, we
need to ensure that the additional information we provide does not reveal confidential
information about calls to people not participating in a call. Fourth, we need to ensure
that effective identity itself is robustly determined and cannot be easily manipulated.
Finally, we need to measure our ability to reduce current attacks such as VoIP spam
and Caller ID spoofing that exist in telecommunication systems due to a lack of
effective identities. We hypothesize that privacy preserving effective identities
can be created in a converged telecommunication infrastructure to reduce
VoIP spam and Caller ID spoofing. This dissertation investigates mechanisms
to create such effective identities.
We first start by looking at VoIP systems, where there have been many mecha-
nisms for establishing basic identity. We provide details of these mechanisms in the
2
background and related work in Chapter 2. As mentioned before, there are many
situations where people receive calls for the first time, from people they do not know
and would be willing to answer it (e.g. parent’s friend). This is known as the in-
troduction problem in peer to peer systems. As current systems do not provide any
additional information, attackers have exploited this to spam users into accepting
calls by claiming to be friends and then going on to sell them unwanted products.
In Chapter 3, we introduce CallRank, a system that provides both local and global
reputation information about callers that can be used to differentiate between a le-
gitimate user and a spammer. Our approach is motivated by the simple observation
that a legitimate user typically makes and receives calls and many of the calls last for
reasonable durations. On the other hand, a spammers/telemarketers goal is to deliver
information to as many people as possible by making a large number of relatively brief
calls. For a spammer, the call pattern is largely unidirectional with short call duration
while it is bidirectional for legitimate users with relatively longer call durations. We
take advantage of this difference in call patterns and create credentials that callers
can provide to recipients as proof of an implicit level of trust. These credentials es-
sentially determine Social Network (SN) linkages [35] between users, enabling us to
distinguish between legitimate users and spammers. We also use call duration along
with the Eigentrust algorithm [93] to develop a global view of the reputation of all
users who either belong to or interact with a domain. We implement CallRank and
demonstrate its ability to identify spammers with high specificity and sensitivity even
in the presence of a significant number of spammers.
We realize that any system that determines the legitimacy of users based on their
social network linkages leaks private information. To illustrate, let us suppose that
Alice wants to prove to Bob that she is a legitimate user (and not malicious) by
showing that that they have a good mutual friend in Charlie. To prove Charlie is a
friend, Alice will need to reveal previous interactions with Charlie that indicate that
3
the two are friends. The more recent and the longer these interactions are, the more
convinced Bob is of Alice and Charlie’s friendship. However, revelation of these inter-
actions is a sacrifice of both Alice’s and Charlie’s privacy. To address this, in Chapter
4, we introduce Privacy Preserving Grapevines, a token/credential framework that
allows a user to prove the existence of a social network path between him/her and
the user he/she is trying to initiate contact with, without actually revealing the path.
We combine the privacy properties of two techniques in cryptography: Delegatable
Anonymous Credentials (DAC) [36] and E-Cash [47] to create this framework. We
show that though this framework has cryptographic overheads that affect call setup
times, we can achieve practical tradeoffs to keep this call setup time low. In addition,
this framework maintains the high specificity and sensitivity of CallRank.
We then look at the broader issue of determining identity across the entire telecom-
munication landscape to address the issue of Caller ID spoofing. Towards this in
Chapter 5, we develop PinDr0p1, an infrastructure to assist users in determining the
provenance of a call - the source and the path taken by a call. Through a combination
of signal processing and machine learning techniques, we show that regardless of the
claimed source, the audio delivered to the receiver exhibits measurable features of
the networks through which the call was delivered. For example, calls that traverse a
VoIP network experience packet loss that results in perceivable effects in the final call
audio. Such artifacts are noticeably absent in calls that have only traversed cellular
or Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs). In particular, the codec trans-
formations applied by multiple intermediary PSTNs, VoIP and cellular networks, in
combination with packet loss and noise characteristics, allow us to develop profiles
for various call sources based solely on features extracted from the received audio. In
1Our mechanisms take advantage of audio and path artifacts that, like the sound made by the
drop of a pin, are largely unobservable to the human ear.
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the absence of any verifiable metadata, these profiles offer a means of developing spe-
cific fingerprints that help identify a particular call source. Using these fingerprints
we show that we are able to distinguish between calls made using specific PSTN,
cellular, Vonage, Skype and other hard and soft phones from locations across the
world with high accuracy. In Chapter 6 we extend techniques developed in Pindr0p
to use anomalies in timbre created by different undersea telecommunication cables to
develop London Calling, a mechanism to identify geography of a caller.
Our results provide strong evidence to support our hypothesis that it is possible
to create privacy preserving effective identities that reduce VoIP spam and Caller ID
spoofing. We finally conclude this thesis in Chapter 7.
5
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Background
Telephony networks are exceedingly complex systems. While once designed, manufac-
tured and run by a single company, today’s networks are an elaborate combination of
many different technologies. We offer a very high-level description of these systems,
how voice is encoded in them and the transformations that occur as voice crosses
between different classes of networks.
As shown in Figure 1, there are three general classes of telephony networks. PSTNs
represent traditional circuit-switched telephony systems. These networks are gener-
ally characterized by lossless connections and high fidelity audio. While pieces of the
core of some of these networks are being replaced by IP connections, these provider
owned links are tightly controlled to ensure near zero packet loss. Like PSTN systems,
cellular networks have a circuit switched core, with portions currently being replaced
by IP links. While these networks can have considerably different technologies de-
ployed in their wireless interfaces, their cores are extremely similar. Finally, VoIP
networks by name run on top of IP links and generally share the same paths as all
other Internet-based traffic. Accordingly, VoIP systems virtually always experience
packet loss.
In all these networks there are two parts to enable calling, (1) signaling that
establishes and tears down the call, and (2) media which carries the voices of the call
participants. These are achieved by different mechanisms in each of these networks








Figure 1: A high-level description of modern telephony systems. Note that a call
between two endpoints may cross a variety of networks. At each gateway, calls are
re-encoded using that network’s codec.
2.1.1 Signaling
The core signaling mechanism used for call setup, routing and control in PSTN and
cellular networks is the common channel signaling system no. 7, SS7. Within the
SS7 protocol stack, the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) User Part (ISUP)
defines the procedures to setup, manage and release trunk circuits that carry voice
and data calls. Despite its name, ISUP is used for both ISDN and non-ISDN calls.
To initiate a call, the calling party goes off hook and dials the directory number
of the called party. These numbers are transmitted as DTMF digits to the closest
telephone exchange’s service switching point (SSP). SSPs are switches that originate
or terminate calls. The SSP then transmits an ISUP Initial Address Message (IAM)
to the destination SSP. This IAM consists among other things the dialed digits and
the voice trunk circuit reserved for this call. The calling party name (Caller ID) is also
transmitted as an optional parameter. When Caller ID is requested to be blocked,
this information is not sent as part of the IAM. The IAM is routed via a packet
switch called a signal transfer point (STP). An STP routes each incoming message to
an outgoing signaling link based on routing information contained in the SS7 message.
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Figure 2: SIP Call Trapezoid. Call duration represents the time between the end of
call setup (200 OK) to the start of call teardown (BY E)
Once the destination SSP confirms that the called party’s line is available for ringing,
it transmits an acknowledgment which translates to the ring tone heard by the calling
party. Once the called party picks up a phone an ISUP answer message (ANM) is
transmitted to the calling party and the two parties then use the reserved trunk to
transmit voice between them.
The signaling mechanism for VoIP is similar to SS7 and is enabled using either the
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)[126], proposed by the IETF or H.323[155] proposed
by the ITU. Since SIP is de facto standard, we discuss how call setup and teardown
is achieved using SIP.
For two users to communicate with each other using SIP, they need to know
each other’s SIP URIs (Universal Resource Identifier). SIP then uses an application
overlay consisting of proxy servers and location services to locate these end points.
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Table 1: Audio Codecs and their typical deployment.
.
Codec Networks Applications
G.711 PSTN, VoIP Standard Telephony
GSM-FR Cellular Cellular Telephony
iLBC VoIP VoIP over Cable
Speex VoIP XBox Live
G.729 VoIP SkypeOut/SkypeIn
A typical SIP call trapezoid is shown in Figure 2. When Alice identified by SIP
URI sip:alice@wonderland.com, calls Bob, sip:bob@music.org, the call request message
(INV ITE) is sent to the proxy server responsible for the wonderland.com domain,
P1. P1 then determines how to route the call to the proxy responsible for Bob’s
domain, music.org, P2. Once P2 receives the request it looks up user Bob and then
routes it to the appropriate endpoint. On receipt of the INV ITE message, Bob’s user
agent (UA) starts to ring, shown by the 180 Ringing in Figure 2. When Bob picks up
the phone, the UA sends a 200 OK message. This initial message exchange forms the
call setup transaction. When Bob or Alice hang up, the respective UA sends a BY E
message and this initiates the call tear-down transaction. Call duration represents the
time between the end of call setup (200 OK) to the start of call teardown (BY E) (see
Figure 2). Call duration is the basic building block of the CallRank scheme proposed
in Chapter 3.
2.1.2 Media
Voice is encoded and decoded in each of these networks using a variety of codecs.
Specific codecs are selected for different networks based on competing goals including
sound quality, robustness to noise and bandwidth requirements. While a large number
of codecs exist, we describe and study the five most commonly used narrow band
codecs in this work. We summarize these codecs and their typical environments in
Table 2.1.2.
The codec used all over the world in PSTNs is G.711 [149], with North America
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and Japan using the mu-law compression algorithm and Europe and the rest of the
world using A-law. Both the algorithms generate a 64 kbps (20 ms audio frames)
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) stream for speech sampled at 8kHz, which is relatively
bandwidth intensive when compared to other codecs. In cellular networks, the GSM
full rate (GSM-FR) [80] codec was the first digital cellular coding standard and is still
widely used in networks around the world. Unlike G.711, which is a waveform coder,
GSM-FR uses predictive coding, which is more common among modern codecs and
allows a large reduction in bandwidth requirements, with GSM-FR having an average
bit rate of 13 kbps.
A plethora of codecs have been specifically designed for VoIP systems. The Inter-
net Low Bit-rate codec (iLBC) [75] is extremely robust to packet losses and operates
on a bit rate of 13.33 kbps (30 ms audio frames) and 15.20 kbps (20 ms audio frames).
iLBC is a mandatory standard for VoIP over Cable and is also used by Google Voice
and Skype [27]. Speex [22] is a Variable Bit Rate (VBR) codec that supports a wide
range of bit-rates from 2.15 kbps to 44 kbps and uses 20 ms audio frames. Speex, in
addition to being supported on many VoIP soft phones, is commonly used in gaming
teleconferencing systems such as Xbox Live [23]. A large number of VoIP systems
also use G.729 (10 ms audio frames) [150], which requires very low bandwidth as it
supports a CBR of 8kbps. Skype also uses G.729 when making and receiving calls
to landlines and mobile phones (SkypeOut/SkypeIn service). It is also used by most
Cisco hard IP phones [26]. Finally, a number of VoIP phones also support G.711,
which is used in PSTN systems.
Audio must be reencoded when passing between two different telephony networks.
For instance, whereas the audio in a call between two PSTN users is likely to only
have been encoded in G.711, both G.711 and GSM-FR will be applied to the audio for
a conversation between users on a PSTN and cellular network, respectively. Encoding
changes occur in media gateways located at the edge of telephony networks, meaning
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that VoIP calls can traverse multiple Internet autonomous systems without necessarily
being reencoded. Through this infrastructure, phone calls can be delivered seamlessly
between users. It is these transformations and the characteristics of the underlying
networks that we seek to measure to establish call provenance proposed in Chapter 5.
2.2 Related Work
The lack of common signaling mechanisms between the different networks has resulted
in easy assertion of any identity. This has resulted in both VoIP spam and in Caller
ID spoofing. We first look at related work in the VoIP spam area and show how are
solution compares with the others. As a large number of proposed solutions including
ours use social networks to identify the legitimacy of a user there are immediate pri-
vacy risks when such information is exchanged. This tradeoff between accountability
and privacy has been studied in peer to peer networks that exchange token informa-
tion to determine the legitimacy of a peer and we highlight this research. Finally,
as we broaden our context across the entire telecommunication landscape, we look
at how other systems have addressed the provenance of information and discuss how
that relates to determining the provenance of a call.
2.2.1 VoIP Spam
Rosenberg et al. [128] provide a comprehensive reference for the various possible
solutions that can be explored for VoIP spam. Techniques from email spam such
as Blacklists, Statistical Blacklists, Greylists, Whitelists and Consent Based Systems
are adopted for VoIP in [57, 135, 82]. The techniques mentioned above are subverted
easily by the creation of new identities, a mechanism used in attacks such as the Sybil
attack[64]. We show that CallRank, however, is resistant to these kind of attacks in
Section 3.3.3.1. Spam based on anomalous characteristics of a spam call is explored
in [145], [134] and [163]. However, the characteristics being monitored are easily
subvertible, once known. Strong authentication is probably the best counter measure
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against SPIT, however techniques based on DKIM[83], P-Asserted-Identity[89] and
SAML[156] specified in [145] and [128] will only be as successful as the fraction of user
base that utilizes it. Establishing absolute identity on the Internet is always going
to be a hard problem. It is unlikely that we will have a practical and a universally
deployable solution based completely on absolute identity.
In the democratic setting of the Internet, reputation based techniques seem to
be most practical and effective. Dantu et al.[57] and Rebahi et al.[120] suggest the
use of buddylists and user ratings for buddies to create dynamic localized whitelists.
However, this restricts the group of users that can call to strictly the user’s SN linkage
and it requires explicit user feedback in the form of ratings. CallRank on the other
hand, uses call duration, which is recorded automatically by the system without
requiring explicit user action.
2.2.2 Accountability and Privacy
Accountability and fairness in P2P systems have predominantly used tokens[103,
55, 28]. Anagnostakis et. al.[28] advocate the notion of transferable tokens and
show the improvements in scalability and redundancy afforded by introducing such
tokens. An alternative to tokens for accountability in P2P systems is the use of
micropayments[174, 159, 87, 84]. In essence, all these schemes prove the existence of
a transfer path by revealing information about that path and therefore have significant
privacy concerns.
Adding privacy requirements to incentive mechanisms(like tokens) has been stud-
ied extensively in reputation and recommender systems[119] and social networks[50],
utilizing a host of cryptographic techniques. Laurent et. al.[46] use group signa-
tures, while Carminati et. al.[50] use digital signatures to provide anonymity. Kai et.
al.[167] use group signatures to add anonymity to the micropayment scheme proposed
in [174]. For our setting, we have demonstrated how the underlying techniques used
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by these schemes still leak privacy. Belenkiy et. al.[37] try to achieve accountability
without losing privacy by using an E-Cash mechanism to provide a currency model
in P2P. However their system does not support transferable coins. A transferable
E-Cash mechanism using the meta proof technique is described in Canard et. al.[49].
However, the meta proof technique is a general circuit based proof that is inefficient
in practice. To solve this, we create Privacy Preserving Grapevines, where we allow
users to act as banks in their own right, creating, issuing and transferring tokens
to each other, since tokens are meaningful only to the issuer (he is the one getting
spammed).
2.2.3 Information Provenance
The concept of data provenance in computing was first studied in database systems.
The proposed techniques seek to identify the source of a piece of data and the process
by which it arrived at the database [45, 79, 38]. Such information can be proactively
added at the source and transformation points as metadata [70, 59] or reactively
obtained through techniques such as query inversion [169, 56]. Such techniques have
been adapted and extended to other platforms including web servers with trusted
hardware [111]. The presence of such mechanisms provides a significantly improved
infrastructure for performing audits and determining data quality [109].
More recently, a number of researchers have attempted to provide provenance
information for networks. Traceback techniques [131, 176, 81] attempt to determine
the true path of packets in the presence of potentially spoofed source information.
Such information can either be added directly to the packets as metadata [131, 140,
172, 118], or by state stored and queried from within the routers themselves [177].
A range of watermarking tools also exist to identify the provenance of flows in IP
networks [165, 99, 85]. The diversity of telephony networks (i.e., circuit switched
PSTN, cellular and VoIP) makes such watermarks extremely difficult. Specifically,
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metadata introduced in one network (e.g., watermarks, path information) is generally
lost when the call is transmitted over another network.
We are not aware of previous work that attempts to identify the provenance of
a phone call in a diverse telephony environment. However, techniques in a purely
Internet-based environment have been considered [146]. Perhaps the closest to our
work are caller identification (Caller-ID) services that provide the caller’s number
or name in PSTN and mobile networks. Calls originating from IP networks tradi-
tionally have no unique associated number or name and therefore cannot be used
to identify the caller [139]. Moreover, a variety of techniques already exist to spoof
phone numbers [12]. Artifacts of calls themselves may provide significant provenance
information. Specifically, because call quality relies greatly on a combination of the
codec [106, 21], the range of end devices [44] and network degradations [61, 125, 102],
the detection of these characteristics using tools designed to measure single-ended
call quality [61, 106, 125] can potentially be used to further improve the provenance
of a call.
In this thesis we will explore several related problems that arise due to a lack of
effective identities. We start by discussing CallRank and how it addresses the VoIP
spam problem in the next chapter. In chapter 4, we propose an extension to CallRank
that continues to use social network linkage information to differentiate legitimate
users and spammers while addressing the privacy risk of sharing such information.
We finally discuss establishing the provenance of calls in Chapters 5 and 6 and show
how that addresses the problem of detecting fraudulent calls and Caller ID spoofing
in a diverse telephony infrastructure.
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CHAPTER III
CALLRANK: COMBATING VOIP SPAM
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems rely on an IP network to set up voice calls
and transmit voice packets. The growing popularity of VoIP, the relatively low cost of
access to IP networks, and the vulnerabilities that exist in systems connected to such
networks makes VoIP an attractive tool for spammers. Spammers and telemarketers
will use VoIP to make unsolicited calls and to send voice mails for the same purposes
for which email spam is currently used. VoIP spam would not only degrade our con-
fidence in telephony but it would be more difficult to handle because of the real-time
processing requirements of voice calls. Examples of large scale VoIP spam already
exist - a company sent out voice mails to all its customers detailing its initial public
offering[132]. If we are not able to combat VoIP spam effectively, we face an unhappy
future where picking up a ringing phone would be a frustrating experience and voice
mailboxes would become clogged with advertisements for unwanted products.
The first stage of voice communication is call setup, a handshake mechanism
between the caller and the call recipient after which the phones start ringing. At this
stage the only information provided is the identity of the caller and the call recipient.
It is only after the call recipient accepts the call, that voice media is exchanged. A
spam engine that filters based on the media content, however successful it is, will not
be able to prevent the phone from ringing constantly. In addition unlike email, voice
packets must be delivered to the user synchronously. Any delay in delivery due to
spam engine processing will result in degraded call quality. Thus, an effective method
for dealing with VoIP spam must rely on a robust identity of the caller rather than
call content. However, determining the exact identity of a user on the Internet is a
15
hard problem. It is sufficient if we are able to differentiate between a legitimate caller
and a spammer. In this work, our focus is on developing a scheme that achieves this
goal.
This work proposes CallRank, a novel mechanism built around call duration,
to differentiate between a legitimate user and a spammer. Our approach is moti-
vated by the simple observation that a legitimate user typically makes and receives
calls and many of the calls last for long durations. On the other hand a spam-
mer’s/telemarketer’s goal is to deliver information to as many people possible, in as
little time, by making a large number of short calls. A spammer will typically receive
no calls or a much smaller number of calls. The difference in call patterns is that,
for a spammer, the call pattern is largely unidirectional while it is bidirectional for
legitimate users. We take advantage of this difference in call patterns and use call
duration to create call credentials that callers can provide to call recipients.
The following simple scenario shows how our call credential based approach can
be used to identify spammers. Assume that Alice makes a call to Bob. If Bob picks
up the phone and talks to Alice, after completion of the call, a call credential can be
generated signifying that Bob and Alice trust each other enough to talk for a certain
duration of time. The longer the call duration, stronger is the call credential. As basic
intuition suggests, if a user receives calls of significant duration on a regular basis, it
is likely that he/she is a legitimate user and not a spammer. There are several ways in
which call credentials can be created when calls are made. For example, when Alice
calls Bob and talks to him for t time, she can create a call credential and provide it
to Bob who can use the credential when making another call to show that he is not
a spammer. It is also possible that the recipient of the call (Bob) generates a call
credential for Alice. Although several of these options exist, in this work we explore
a mechanism where a caller, when he/she speaks to a call recipient, provides a call
credential to the call recipient.
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For each user we use call credentials to determine Social Network (SN)[35] linkages.
We also use call duration along with the Eigentrust algorithm[93] to develop a global
view of the reputation of all users that either belong to or interact with a domain.
For a spammer to be successful in the resulting system, CallRank, he/she must get
other legitimate users to call and speak to him/her for significantly large durations.
We believe this will be extremely hard as people rarely call up a spammer. If they
inadvertently do make a call to a spammer, the conversation will not last for very
long.
The following are the key contributions of this work:
• We introduce call duration based credentials as the uniform underlying mecha-
nism to support a number of techniques to determine if a caller is a spammer.
• We explore the use of SNs based on the call credentials to allow two users to
make a call.
• If SN linkages are unavailable between users, we use a variation of the Eigentrust
algorithm to assign global reputations based on call durations.
• We perform a detailed evaluation of CallRank and show that we are able to
achieve low false negative and low false positive rates even in the presence of a
significant fraction of spammers.
The rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 discusses SNs, and Section 3.2
discusses the Eigentrust algorithm. The key components of CallRank are presented
in Section 3.3. An evaluation of CallRank and its results are discussed in Section 3.4.
3.1 Local Reputation Using Social Network Linkages
In CallRank, SNs are used to decide when to accept a call credential. SNs model
associations that exist between a set of entities (typically humans). A distinctive
feature of these networks is their tendency to cluster, measured by the clustering
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coefficient[166]. Mathematically, an SN can be described as a graph G = (V,E),
where V , the set of vertices/nodes represent people and E, the set of edges represents
some relationship/association between the people. G is referred to as the community.
Consider a three vertex community consisting of nodes A, B and C. If a particular
node, A, is connected to the other two nodes, B and C, then for the community to
exhibit a high clustering coefficient B and C must also be connected. This tendency
to form triangles from wedges is the nature of a highly clustered SN. In a voice
communication system if there is a scenario where user A calls user B and user B
calls user C, then due to the similar clustering nature in these systems, it is highly
likely that user C will at some point call user A. This high likelihood coupled with
call credentials is used in CallRank to provide a local mechanism to determine if a
caller is a spammer or not.
3.2 Global Node Reputation Using Eigentrust
We utilize the Eigentrust algorithm[93] to determine the reputation of a set of peers
based on their interactions. In Eigentrust, each peer i decides a normalized local
trust value for another peer j, based on the number of satisfactory and unsatisfac-
tory transactions it has had with that peer. This value is represented as cij It then
uses a transitive notion of trust to aggregate these local trust values to a system
wide reputation value for all peers. If
−→
t represents a vector containing these val-
ues, the eigentrust algorithm determines this vector by solving
−→
t = (CT )n ∗ −→e for
n = large number of iterations. C is the matrix containing the normalized local
trust values [cij], ∀i, j. −→e is the unit 1-norm, that is ei = 1/m, where m is the total
number of peers in the system.
−→
t converges to the left principal eigenvector of C.
In case there exists pre-trusted peers P , we need to ensure that these end up with
high reputations. Therefore to converge faster, we can use −→p , instead of −→e where
pi = 1/|P | if i ε P and pi = 0 otherwise. The system to solve, in the presence of
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Figure 3: Call duration represented as a reputation credential. This is the building




t = (CT )n ∗ −→p .
3.3 CallRank Overview
3.3.1 Voice Call Duration
Consider a call from Alice to Bob where the call duration is 10 minutes, as shown
in Figure 3. This, to us, represents an implicit statement that Alice trusts Bob
enough to speak to him for 10 minutes. On termination of the call, Alice’s user agent
(UA) will then automatically hand a secure call credential to Bob stating that ”Alice
spoke to Bob for 10 minutes”, represented by CCAB. We ensure its security through
cryptographic primitives discussed in Section 3.3.5. The next section discusses how
we can combine this credential and SN theory to determine what call credentials can
be trusted.
3.3.2 Using SNs to Accept a Call Credential
Consider, once again, the system as described in Figure 3, following which Bob talks
to Charlie for 15 minutes. At this point Bob’s UA hands a credential capturing this
information to Charlie, CCBC . At a later point in time assume Charlie tries to call
Alice. If Charlie’s UA presents CCBC to Alice’s UA at call setup time, then Alice can
accept the call since she knows Bob (as she has recorded information of the call from
her to Bob). In a general scenario, the caller UA will present to the call recipient’s
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UA a set of credentials when initiating a call. The call recipient’s UA will see if any
of the credentials can be used to establish a SN linkage and then decide either to
accept or reject the call. Such a decision may consider several factors to determine
how important or useful a particular credential is. For example, when Alice receives
call credential CCBC from Charlie, which has been generated by Bob, the factors that
will influence Alice’s decision to accept the call are: (1) How strong is CCBC?, and
(2) How fresh is CCBC?
The strength of the credential is dependent on the call duration value encapsu-
lated within it. Thus, Bob speaking to Charlie for an hour will generate a stronger
credential than Bob speaking to Charlie for a couple of minutes. Alice’s UA also
checks for the freshness of the credential. For this we assume that the UA’s have
access to approximately synchronized common clocks and we believe most phones
will be time synchronized in a commercial VoIP deployment. Alice’s UA can be con-
figured with a policy stating that only call credentials with durations greater than a
particular threshold, say TCD, and timestamps within a certain time window shall be
considered. We use the average call duration of the user as the value for TCD, that is
TCD =
∑
Duration of Callsmade by user
Total number of callsmade by user
.
A simpler scenario is when Alice speaks to Bob and Bob later wants to talk to
Alice. Bob can use the credential that Alice provided to him. In this case there is a
direct relationship between caller and call recipient and the call can be accepted. In
general, calls are accepted only if there exists, between caller and call recipient either
a direct relationship, or a transitive single hop SN linkage. We restrict the linkage to
a single hop because then callers can only use credentials directly presented to them.
This restricts misuse of credentials and keeps the design simple.
In our evaluation of CallRank, each UA maintains a record of all the people he/she
called and a list of call credentials from users who made calls. The decision to accept
or reject a call is then at the UA level and no other SIP component needs to get
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involved. This forms a scalable load distributed solution as each UA is responsible
for the calls it accepts or rejects. In most commercial phones, similar call history
information is maintained under Dialled Calls and Received Calls. We can extend
Received Calls to also store the call credentials.
3.3.2.1 Threats to SN Based Scheme
If a spammer needs to defeat our SN based model and make a call to a particular user,
he/she will have to penetrate the immediate SN of the user. Consider the scenario
where a spammer wants to call Alice. He/She will either have to get a call credential
directly from Alice or from someone to whom Alice makes calls. Since it is unlikely
that a legitimate user, such as Alice, or her immediate SN will call the spammer and
talk to him/her for sufficiently long periods of time, the spammer will find it hard to
obtain such a credential.
Assume the spammer manages to convince a user Bob (who is part of Alice’s
immediate SN) to talk to him/her for a sufficient duration. This may happen when
Bob inadvertently calls the spammer once. Since the spammer now has a credential
from Bob, he/she is able to spam everyone who makes calls to Bob including Alice.
However, the freshness constraint of the credential will only allow the spammer a
short time window where he/she can spam users who call Bob. If the spammer, on
the other hand, is able to get Bob to call him/her regularly, then he/she will have a
constant supply of fresh credentials. In such a case, Alice on being spammed, can now
decide that she will no longer accept calls which present call credentials from Bob.
Again, the spammer is only successful for a short duration. If the spammer needs to
disseminate information to a large number of users, he/she will need to penetrate all
their possibly disjoint SNs in a similar fashion. The down side of our SN scheme is
that there will be situations where even legitimate users will not be able to use call
credentials because there exists no SN linkage between them. The global reputation
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Figure 4: The left principal eignevector of the sample matrix is the global reputation
of this matrix. The matrix cannot be rank deficient and therefore each row must at
least have one non zero entry
scheme discussed in the next section will be used to address this problem.
3.3.3 Global Reputation Using Eigentrust
Over the course of some period of time, assume that Alice talks to Bob, Charlie
and Dave and the talk times are as shown in Figure 4. We can use call duration
to represent the reputation value that Alice implicitly assigns to people she calls.
Formally, the normalized local reputation value provided by a user i who calls a user
j is calculated as
rij =
Duration of all calls to j∑
k Duration of all calls to user k
. (1)
This ensures that rij is between 0 and 1 and for any row i,
∑
∀j rij = 1. This
is analogous to the normalized local trust value in the Eigentrust system[93]. The
advantage of normalizing is that reputation values are not arbitrarily high or low.
This prevents users who form a malicious collective from assigning a high reputation
value to other users in the collective and low value to legitimate users.
The first row in Figure 4 represents Alice’s reputation values towards Bob, Charlie
and Dave based on equation (1). Similarly the reputation values that Bob, Charlie
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and Dave assign to each other and Alice can be calculated and form the subsequent
rows in a reputation matrix, R. For the system comprising only of Alice, Bob, Charlie
and Dave, the reputation matrix is shown in Figure 4. If we need a system wide view
of reputation values then we have to aggregate these local reputation values. We
discussed in Section 3.2 that this is the leading left eigenvector, λ of the matrix R.
λi then represents the reputation of user i as perceived by the system as a whole. In
calculating the leading eigenvector, we use the power method specified in [76]. We
deviate from the method by normalizing the trust vector obtained at the end of each
iteration using its 1-norm (the method in [76] uses the 2-norm). Using the 1-norm
ensures that the final eignevector, λ, is such that 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1, ∀i and
∑
i λi = 1. Thus
the system as a whole has a total possible reputation of 1 and each individual has
some fraction of this reputation. Using a 1-norm over a 2-norm does not seem to
affect the convergence rate in our experiments.
Proxies that provide billing services maintain call duration information for all
users within their domain. The proxy is, therefore, the best place to maintain and
update the reputation matrix. Periodically it can calculate and update the leading
eigenvector of the matrix. In addition the proxy can also include users (from other
domains) who have either made or received calls to or from this domain in its repu-
tation matrix. In CallRank, when a proxy server receives a call request, it consults
the eigenvector calculated to obtain the reputation value for the caller and appends
this information to the request. The call recipient can then decide based on a thresh-
old value if calls will be accepted or not. In our evaluation only the call recipient’s
proxy appends a reputation value which makes the value hard to be tampered with.
We can also have the caller’s proxy provide a reputation value but that will be less
trustworthy.
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3.3.3.1 Threats to Global Reputation Scheme
We discussed how it is hard for a spammer to penetrate a legitimate user’s SN and
thus compromise CallRank’s effectiveness. It is equally hard for the spammer to
obtain a high global reputation value. This is because the reputation value is based
on call interactions with a number of users and takes into account the reputation
of these users. If a spammer needs to have a high reputation value, he/she will
need a significant number of moderately reputed users to call him/her and speak
for sufficiently long durations. This is an unlikely occurrence. A legitimate user, on
the other hand, will have a high reputation value due to call interactions with other
legitimate users (a feedback loop). This implies even fairly sophisticated attacks like
the Sybil attack[64] can be thwarted because coming to the system with a new identity
implies no SN linkages or reputation and this is detrimental towards making calls.
3.3.4 The Introduction Problem
When a new legitimate user joins a VoIP system, he has no social network linkages in
that system and a low reputation value. This will change if other users call him/her
increasing his reputation value and providing him/her with call credentials. However,
other users are unaware of his entry into the VoIP system. In order to notify other
users he will need to make the first call. In CallRank, however, all calls he makes
will be flagged as spam calls, which amounts to a false positive. We can fix this by
combining CallRank with other schemes proposed for VoIP spam such as an audio
Turing test or a computational puzzle. When a user is flagged as a spammer, he will
then be subject to the Turing test or a computational puzzle or even a personalized
question from the call recipient (what is my high school nickname). The call is
accepted if the caller is able to successfully answer any of these tests. In our simulation
we have not included such a Turing test and this forms part of our future work.
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3.3.5 Call Credentials
The call credential needs to have accurate and secure information about the call
durations. A call credential CC consists of A, the identity of the caller, B, the
identity of the call recipient, t, the call duration and TS, the time stamp of the call
along with a digital signature of the same information. We assume that each user
has a public/private key pair which is used to generate the digital signature. If not
already available, this pair can be generated by the UA on first use. Associating a
public key with a particular user is done with key rings in the manner proposed in
[100], thus avoiding the use of an infrastructure such as PKI.
The accuracy of the information within the credential can be verified by the proxy
which also records call duration information. We assume the proxy has an accurate
value of call duration as it provides billing services. Therefore, the proxy does not
need call credentials for calculating reputation values. In fact, if the proxy is also
used to determine the SN linkage for a call, we do not need call credentials. The call
duration information recorded by the proxy is sufficient. However, we believe moving
the SN linkage detection to the proxy makes the system unscalable.
To understand the call credential better, we consider what it means from a hu-
man perspective. This credential is a record of the user’s past observed behavior in
the system or his/her call history. If the user is an active member of a particular
VoIP community, making and receiving calls, he/she will accumulate the community
relevant credentials through his/her interactions, making it easier to identify him/her
accurately within the community. This is exactly how it works in the real world.
If for some reason there is a sufficiently long break from the community then when
he/she re-enters, he/she will once again have to reestablish himself/herself. Since
credential collection is transparent, users can use the system with minimal impact on
usability. Using call duration as a building block has the following advantages. It is
(1) implicit, (2) quantifiable (3) easily verifiable, and (4) easily understood.
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3.3.6 Discusssion of CallRank Algorithm
To summarize, the CallRank algorithm works as follows. On receipt of a call setup
message, the UA first checks to see if any call credentials presented by the caller
belong to users to which the UA has made calls. If such a credential is found and
it satisfies the policy duration and freshness constraints, the call is accepted. If no
credential satisfies the constraints then the algorithm checks the reputation value of
the caller. If this satisfies a particular acceptable reputation threshold, then the call is
accepted. Otherwise, the call is deemed spam and is rejected. Another technique like
a Turing test may be used at this point but the present implementation of CallRank
does not support this.
CallRank does have some limitations. The first limitation is that legitimate users,
who make a large number of outgoing calls but receive very few incoming ones, would
not be able to collect call credentials. Typical examples are emergency services and
banks. Since these systems are part of critical infrastructure, they can be seeded
with high global reputation values. The second concern is one of privacy because
the collection of call credentials provides user with call history information of their
immediate SN. We discuss how we address this in the next chapter.
3.4 CallRank Evaluation
We simulate CallRank with a synthetic call workload to evaluate its effectiveness. In
particluar, we measure how quickly users can distinguish between legitimate callers
and spammers and the results are discussed in Sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. We
study legitimate caller acceptance in Section 3.4.4.
Our initial experimental setup consists of DNS, proxy and statistics servers and
user agents. Initially, only the DNS and the statistics server are running. Each proxy
server registers with the DNS server, and the user agents register with the proxy. User
agents either behave as reputed users (seeded with high reputation values), legitimate
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users (users who make legitimate calls but are not seeded with high reputation values),
or as spammers. A legitimate or a reputed UA makes calls to other phones with inter
call and call duration values that are Poisson distributed. The choice of call recepient
is Zipfian distributed. Spamming UAs, however, make calls to as many other UAs as
possible.
Call setup goes through proxies which consult the DNS server and then route
the call to the proxy in the call recipient domain, which in turn forwards to the call
recipient. During the learning period, which can be set, a call recipient will accept all
calls. After the learning period, a call is accepted or rejected based on call credentials
and reputation value. All call interactions are recorded at the statistics server which
track number of accepted and rejected calls for both legitimate users and spammers.
Our initial setup consists of three domains each served by a proxy server and 200 users
initially registered in each domain. 1% of the 600 users are reputed. The number of
spammers and regular users is varied based on the experiment. We use a simulated
call workload model. To simulate call processing for a sufficient period of time, 100
seconds of system time models 1 day of simulated time.
3.4.1 Effect of Spammers
The first set of experiments determines the effect of spammers on CallRank. Three
runs are conducted where the spammers present are varied from 1%, 10% and 20%
and the fraction of spam calls accepted for each case is measured. The results are as
shown in Figure 5 which plots the fraction of spam calls accepted with time. When
legitimate users join the system, they have a learning period during which time they
accept ALL calls. This period is essential for the user to gather credentials and build
reputation. However, they are vulnerable to spam calls. The spammer thus needs to
detect a new user within this learning period time window and then send all the spam
they can generate. In our simulation the learning period for all UAs is fixed at 1 day.
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Figure 5: Effect of spammers. This experiment assumes an aggressive threat model
where spammers identify new users in the system as soon as they join.
All three scenarios initially show increase as spammers learn about more and more
legitimate users and are able to send spam to them successfully. This increase lasts
roughly for the learning period and then starts decreasing rapidly. This is because
legitimate users, using the CallRank scheme, are now able to differentiate between
spammers and legitimate users. For all three scenarios there are no new spam calls
accepted after 4.5 days.
As the percentage of spammers increases from 1% to 10% to 20% the probability
of some spammer discovering a legitmate user increases and the ability to send larger
amounts of spam increases as well. This is seen in Figure 5 as each of the curves shows
higher false negative rates of 1% to 10% to 22% respectively. Thus, the false positive
rate increases linearly with the number of spammers. However, these numbers are
contingent on the fact that legitimate users are discovered by spammers within their
short learning period time window. If the legitimate user is undiscovered then the
rates will drop down even further. In fact, once a legitimate user crosses his/her
learning period he/she is able to identify spammers (old and new) with ease.
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Figure 6: Impact of new spammers. As users stay in the system longer, CallRank
helps them to be robust against new spammers.
3.4.2 Addition of New Spammers
We start with an initial population of 600 user agents, 1% of which are reputed
UAs, 10% spammer UAs and the rest are legitimate UAs. We wait until the system
stabilizes, that is no new spam calls are accepted or no new legitmate calls are rejected.
From Figure 6 we see this occurs after 2 days and the number of accepted spam calls
has saturated around 1000 calls. We then add spammers, 1%, 10% and then 20%
of the current UA population. As seen the addition of these spammers does not
increase the number of accepted spam calls illustrating that CallRank’s mechanisms
ensure that new spammers do not affect existing legitimate users. The reason behind
this is that a new spammer, when introduced, does not have any SN linkage or
reputation. Therefore, existing legitimate users will not accept any calls originating
from them. Thereafter a spammer, due to his behavior, will not improve either his
SN or reputation implying that at no stage will a legitimate user accept a call from
him. This is a big advantage of the CallRank scheme where older users by virtue of
their good call history become more adept at rejecting spam calls. Attacks such as
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Figure 7: Adding legitimate users. The false positive rate increases to 3% but reduces
significantly as legitimate users are recognized by the system to be legitimate
the Sybil attack which work very well against techniques such as blacklists will not
succeed against CallRank.
The addition of new spammers generates more spam and we can see this in the
increase in the number of rejected spam calls in Figure 6. At each stage of the
introduction (marked by arrows) we can see an increase in the slope of rejected spam
calls thus corroborating CallRank’s effectiveness.
3.4.3 False Positives
Although not shown in the previous experiments, the false positive rates are also
extremely low. For example, in the simulation run that involved 600 users, 1% of
which are reputed and 10% spammers, there were only 3 calls that were wrongly
rejected to give a false positive rate of .02%. This low rate is because all users are
introduced at the same time and their learning periods coincide. Therefore, all users
were simultaneously aware of the rest of the users by the end of this period. However,
in a realistic scenario, users join a system over a period of time. To simulate this we
created 600 users, 200 in each domain, over a period of 10 days. Within a domain
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Figure 8: Legitimate user acceptance. If a user behaves legitimately, it takes him 3.5
days of simulation time to be accepted by half the user base.
users are created 3 hrs (simulated time) of each other. The false positive rate of such
a system is as shown in Figure 7. The rate initially increases to a high of 3% and
then reduces gradually. This is because, when a user joins the system, he has no SN
linkage and no reputation which by CallRank’s perspective is the characteristics of a
spammer. Therefore, most of his calls will be rejected. However, if the user behaves
legitimately, this rate drops soon enough showing that CallRank is able to determine
that the user is legitimate. False positives do not have the same connotation as in
the email world, where it implies a permanent loss of information. In the VoIP world,
since interactions are synchronous, a user whose call is rejected can be asked to take
an audio Turing test. This will only result in occasional longer call setup times,
typically occurring when the user initially joins the system.
3.4.4 User Acceptance
We studied the acceptance of a legitimate user into a system containing 1000 existing
users. This is shown in Figure 8. As we can see a legitimate user is accepted by half
the total user base in 3.5 days. However, this factor can be used by a spammer to
31
alternate between being a legitimate user and a spammer, thus, providing him with
the ability to spam a large set of users. This threat is not as large as it seems, because
behaving as a legitimate user entails getting people with significant SN linkages or
moderate reputation values to talk to the spammer on a continuous basis. When a
legitimate user joins a voice communication system, almost immediately there are
other legitimate users who talk to him thus creating his SN and establishing his
reputation. This happens naturally for most people who have an established life
outside the VoIP system. Their SN linkages or their reputations are just extensions
of their real world persona. On the other hand a spammer has no existence outside
the VoIP system, and so, legitimate users will never call him when he gets introduced
into the system.
We also see that the graph in Figure 8 saturates at 70% (say set S) of the user
base. That implies that anytime this user calls any of the users belonging to the
remaining 30% (S ′), he will be treated as a spammer. This is because there exists no
SN linkage between the user and S ′ and the user’s reputation value is significantly
lower than users in S ′. From our logs we see that S ′ consist of either the initially
pre-reputed users or users that have been in the system in a legitimate fashion long
enough to have become extremely reputed. This behavior is beneficial as it implies
spamming users who are very reputed is going to be extremely hard.
3.5 Conclusion
Within VoIP systems there are multiple mechanisms to establish identity. However,
for scenarios where users need additional information (e.g., when it is a parent’s friend
calling and the identity just says it is Joe calling) there are no suitable options to
be able to take a call . To create these effective identities, we proposed CallRank, a
system that uses call duration in conjunction with social network linkages and global
reputation to determine if a user is a spammer or not. Our simulation explored the
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effectiveness of CallRank and showed that it adapts over time, allowing users with
legitimate call history to make calls easily while defeating spammers. In addition,
our system is able to accept new legitimate users relatively easily while ensuring that
new spammers are not able to affect existing users. This shows that CallRank is able
to create effective identities that reduce VoIP spam. However in the next chapter,
we discuss how expanding CallRank to consider social network paths of larger than
two hops immediately reveals confidential information. To address this limitation we
then develop a system that creates effective identities that are privacy preserving and
continue to be robust against VoIP spam.
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CHAPTER IV
PRIVACY PRESERVING GRAPEVINES: PRIVATELY
CAPTURING SOCIAL NETWORK INTERACTIONS
As discussed in the previous chapter VoIP systems suffer from the spam problem
[4, 16], primarily due to the inability of these systems to determine whether a user
initiating contact for the first time is honest or malicious - the introduction problem.
For example, in IM systems such as Yahoo Messenger or Google Talk, users explic-
itly invite people that they would like to chat with. To counteract this, in AIM[1],
spammers provide unsolicited content as part of the initial invite request itself. Some
systems like Google Talk allow users who have had prior email correspondence to
automatically chat with each other. Automatic introduction is especially important
in real time systems like VoIP, where a call needs to be accepted or rejected as soon as
it is received. To illustrate, consider a scenario where Alice’s father’s friend’s son, say
Bob, would like to talk to her about admission to a university program (or job open-
ings at her workplace). Social network (SN) theory suggests that higher the number
of such weak ties between users, higher the likelihood of of a new direct tie being
established between them[77, 33]. In VoIP, such a tie could be gleaned by looking
at the call graph between users. In this case, there would exist a call path between
Alice and Bob. Alice should not have to explicitly determine whether there exists
such a call path as she could be subjected to spam in the process. We, thus, need an
automated framework that is able to establish the existence of a SN call path between
two users that are trying to communicate for the first time.
In addition to the introduction problem, it is equally important to determine
whether a user would like to continue communicating with people that he has been
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introduced to. To illustrate, consider a user who is travelling to France and calls a
travel agent to make trip plans. If the travel agent does not specialize in flight tickets
to France, he could get fellow travel agents (his SN) to talk to the user. As long
as the travel agent and/or his SN provides valuable information to the user, there
is continued communication between them. However, when the travel agent starts
contacting the user with promotional offers, the user will stop taking his calls. Since
this information is unsolicited by the user, it again constitutes spam. Therefore, in
addition, to being able to determine SN call paths, the framework should be able to
capture the willingness of a user to continue communicating with a particular user.
In essence, to provide a good user experience in the presence of a spammer threat
model, a system needs to address two different challenges. The first allows users
without a direct link to communicates with each other, and the second monitors the
quality and validity of a link that exists between two users. CallRank[29], tries to
address this problem by encapsulating call duration as a digitally signed call creden-
tial that is transferred from a caller to call recipient. The call recipient uses this call
credential to talk to the user or to the user’s immediate friends. Since a spammer
hardly receives calls and when he does, finds it hard to engage users in conversation,
he is unable to obtain call credentials necessary to call and spam legitimate users.
Specifically, in CallRank, at the end of a VoIP call between Alice(caller) and Bob(call
recipient) that lasts 10 minutes, Alice issues a digitally signed call token to Bob,
represented by TA→B. At a later instance when Bob wants to talk to Alice’s friend,
Charlie, with whom he has had no previous direct interaction, he presents TA→B to
prove to him that someone in his SN (namely Alice) was willing to talk to him. The
factors that influence Charlie’s decision to accept this call credential include how well
he knows Alice, how long was the call and how recent was it. This provides Charlie
great control on the calls he accepts. However, he also gets to know precisely when
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and for how long Alice and Bob talked, something that violates their privacy. Call-
Rank restricts itself to immediate friends (two hops) as the loss in privacy, illustrated
above, is aggravated as the number of hops increase. Though we used the notation
CCAB in CallRank, we use T
A→B in this chapter as we consider a larger number of
hops and need to clearly establish what constitutes a SN path. The two notations
are equivalent. The CallRank setting clearly shows how SN call history provides a
valuable mechanism to differentiate between regular users and spammers. However,
these credentials are not privacy preserving. In addition, since they only allow a
two hop SN, they are restrictive and lose valuable weak tie information that can be
obtained by considering a larger hop SN.
In this chapter, we create a token framework that uses delegatable anonymous
credentials (DACs)[36] to create N hop transferable tokens that allow a user to prove
the existence of a transfer path between him and the user he is trying to initiate
contact with, without actually revealing the path. If a token transfer is associated
with a VoIP call then the token transfer path represents a chain of calls between two
callers. This information can be used by legitimate users to prove the existence of a
weak social tie (father’s friend’s son) between them and the user they are trying to
call. In addition, we need these tokens to be single use to capture a user’s continued
endorsement of a direct link(strong social tie). Towards this we extend DACs with
techniques from E-Cash[47] to create single use tokens with the ability to identify
token double spenders. Single use tokens also ensure that malicious users cannot
indefinitely reuse tokens that they either obtain directly or through some call path.
We implement the token framework using the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC)
library[24] and utilize it in the VoIP setting to explore its performance in the presence
of a spammer threat model. We believe other communication systems and SN based
services can also use this framework with minor modifications.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
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1. We identify the requirements for a framework that allows a new user, Bob, to
prove the existence of SN call path between him and Alice, without revealing the
actual path. In addition, the framework allows us to capture Alice’s willingness
to continue communicating with Bob.
2. We create a transferable single use token mechanism that extends delegat-
able anonymous credentials[36] with techniques from E-Cash[47] to realize this
framework.
3. We provide an implementation of this framework using the PBC library and
experimentally evaluate the costs associated with its operations.
4. We apply this framework to a VoIP setting and demonstrate that it can combat
the spam problem with low false positive and false negative rates.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.1 we discuss the
requirements of the desired framework, followed by possible approaches in section 4.2.
We show that none of these approaches satisfy all the requirements and we develop
our solution by first discussing the building blocks: DACs and E-Cash in section 4.3.
In section 4.4 we discuss how to combine DACs and E-Cash to create our single use
privacy preserving transferable token framework. We discuss implementation details,
and results that include operation times of our framework and the performance of the
framework with respect to the VoIP spam threat model in section 4.6.
4.1 Token Setting and Required Properties
An example multi-hop call chain is shown in figure 9 and provides the setting for our
token framework. In this setting, a user A1 calls another user A2, speaks for a certain
duration and at the end of the call issues a token, TA1 to A2. A2 can use this token
to call A1 back at a later time. In this example, A2 subsequently calls A3 and at the

















Figure 9: Multi-hop Token Transfer. A token from A1 is transferred k hops until it
is finally used by Ak+1 to talk to A1. The token must be constructed to prove that
this k−hop path is legitimate.
a good strategy of deciding when A2 issues his own token or transfers someone else’s
token in section 4.6.2. For now, A3 gets the transferred token and can, once again,
either use this to talk to A1 or transfer it further. As shown in figure 9 this token is
subsequently transferred to a user Ak+1, k hops away. Finally, Ak+1 decides to use
the token to talk to A1 with whom he has had no previous interaction and presents
TA1 . Using TA1 , A1 can decide whether to accept or reject the call. In fact, since any
user Ai, 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 can use the token to talk to A1, at the very least, the token
should contain the identity of the token issuer. We assume this information does not
need to be anonymized and argue that requiring this is both inefficient and does not
provide a greater level of privacy.
Considering this setting, the three broad goals for a token are:
1. It can prove the existence of a transfer path between two users trying to estab-
lish communication for the first time. When Ak+1 calls A1, the token should
convince A1 that there exists a transfer path between them.
2. It can capture the willingness of a user to continue communication with a partic-
ular user and his SN. Tokens given to A2 and his SN should not allow unlimited
accessibility to A1 as such a scheme can be misused.
3. It should achieve 1 and 2 above in a privacy preserving and efficient manner.
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These goals translate to one or more of the properties listed below:
Unforgeability and Verifiability: The unforgeability property requires unforge-
ability of the token with respect to its issuing entity and the transfer path information
that it carries. Specifically, when user A1 calls user A2, the token issued at the end
of the call, TA1 , should be unforgeable. This implies no other user should be able
to issue a token on A1’s behalf. As the token is transferred, information about each
transfer is appended to the token and this information should also be unforgeable.
Specifically, when the token claims that it was transferred from user Ai−1 to Ai then
such a transfer should have actually occurred. This ensures that when A1 finally
receives the token from Ak+1, the unforgeability of the token issuer and the unforge-
ability of the transfer path information will allow Ak+1 to prove the existence of such
a path. We make the assumption that honest users transfer tokens only during calls
and we note that without an all observing trusted third party there is no way of
ensuring token transfers are tied to a call. Malicious entities may choose to transfer
the tokens without a call. Despite this, a malicious entity should not be able to issue
a token on behalf of an honest user or claim the existence of a transfer or a transfer
path without it having occurred. The verifiability property requires that along with
the token issuer, any user should be able to verify that the token is indeed issued by
the issuer and the transfer path information is verifiably correct. This prevents the
existence of bogus tokens in the system that are only discarded when they are finally
submitted to the issuer.
A scheme that satisfies the above requirement can address goal (1). On the other
hand, a user’s willingness (or unwillingness) to continue interactions with another
user, is useful in capturing the evolving nature of interactions. Since connections can
be fleeting, as in the travel agent example, or can go away after a longer association
(for example, relationships gone sour), deactivation is necessary. Also, a malicious
entity might gain the trust of users and then start behaving maliciously. Essentially,
39
a scheme that assumes a user’s behavior is going to always remain the same fails to
realize any of these scenarios. In order to address goal (2) the token needs to satisfy
the following requirement:
Single Use Tokens: Revisiting the travel agent example, we see that an infinitely
reusable/non revocable token cannot capture the user’s unwillingness to talk to the
travel agent and his SN. Therefore tokens need to either be single use, have a restricted
lifetime or support a revocation policy. Single use tokens provide a fair exchange for a
users’ interaction time. In the VoIP setting, if A1 talked to A2 for 10 minutes then the
token TA1 provides A2 or his social network the ability to talk to A1 for a proportional
period of time. If A1 is no longer willing to talk to A2, as in the travel agent example,
then A2 only has a fixed supply of A
′
1s tokens that he will eventually run out of. A
more time sensitive approach is the use of token lifetimes where tokens expire after
a specified time limit. However, determining what is a good token lifetime is hard,
particularly when tokens are transferable, as the time between token issue and token
use will vary. In addition, token lifetimes reveal information about the time of token
issue. A more elaborate mechanism is incorporating token revocation. Anytime an
issuer would like to deactivate a link to another user and his SN, he could send a
token revocation to the user. However, this would require the user to keep state of all
the other users to whom that token was transferred. All users who received this token
would also need to maintain similar state and an elaborate revocation propagation
mechanism would need to be put in place. In this light, single use tokens seem a
practical token control mechanism to gauge a user’s willingness to interact. They
also allow issuers to decide the number of tokens to issue, thus requiring malicious
users to obtain a steady supply of tokens for any user they wish to spam. However,
single use tokens do not prevent token double spenders, users who transfer the same
token to different users. Since only one of these tokens will be honored by the issuer,
an honest user’s call might be rejected in the process. Therefore, in addition to being
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single use, it is important to be able to identify a token double spender.
Privacy: For honest users, a token is transferred during a call and contains
sensitive call information. In achieving the above two requirements the scheme should
ensure that details of a call should only be known to users directly participating in
that call. Consider a call sequence: Ai−1 → Ai → Ai+1 for token TA1 . In this case
when Ai transfers the token to Ai+1, Ai+1 should only be able to identify that the
token was issued originally by A1 and that it has been verifiably transferred at each
hop culminating at Ai. The token should not reveal the identities of previous holders
of the token, including the fact that it was transferred from Ai−1 to Ai. Therefore, a
user in the transfer chain should only know who the token issuer is, who the token
was received from and to whom it is being transferred. A user not in the transfer
chain(example, someone who snoops a token off the wire) can at most know the
identity of the token issuer as this information does not reveal any of his interactions.
This notion of privacy should be preserved for all the contents of the token. We
assume that the token issuer, for tokens issued by him, never acts maliciously.
Efficiency: The token scheme will essentially need to support the following op-
erations: (a) token issue, (b) token transfer, (c) token submit and (d) double spender
identification. In relation to VoIP, a caller at the beginning of a call submits a token.
The call recipient accepts the call if the token is correct and is not duplicated, else
the call is rejected. At the end of an accepted call the caller either issues a token of
his own or transfers another users’ token. Since these operations are tied to call setup
and teardown in VoIP, they must be efficient in practice.
4.2 Possible Approaches
Before arriving at our proposed solution, we considered a number of possible ap-
proaches. None of them satisfy all the requirements but provide insights into the
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challenges for creating a feasible scheme. We provide a brief overview of these ap-
proaches.
The simplest construct would be creating a token using a message authentication
code (MAC) under the secret key of the issuer. The token issuer can always verify
the validity of the token once it is submitted back to him. However, none of the other
users can verify that the MAC was indeed generated by the issuer. To address this,
we can create tokens using digital signatures (DS)[50]. The token issuer signs the
token with his secret key and any user can verify that the token is generated by the
issuer. However, this does not verifiably prove the existence of a transfer path. In
addition, a malicious entity can snoop the token off the wire and make many copies
of the token and transfer it across different paths. Even if there exists some serial
number mechanism that prevents the token from being reused, there will be no way
of identifying the user who made copies (double spent) of the token. Since the token
double spender cannot be caught, tokens themselves become useless and cannot really
ensure fair use of the system.
To prove the existence of a transfer path, user certificates could be employed
to validate the transfer. If a user, A1 wants to issue a token T
A1 to user A2, he
can associate a certificate with the token by signing A2’s public key with his secret
key, CertA1(pkA2). A2 can use his secret key to prove to any user that he holds a
valid certificate from A1. A2 can transfer the token to A3 and in doing so, needs
to provide a similar certificate for A3, Cert
A2(pkA3). A3 now holds the token and
the associated certificate chain (CertA1(pkA2), CertA2(pkA3)) to prove that he is the
valid owner of the token. To prove the validity of a token any user must show an
associated certificate chain that leads up to him. However, this clearly reveals all the
interactions that have occurred so far. For example, when user A3 further transfers
the token to A4, he has to reveal the certificate to prove token validity, which in turn
reveals the interaction A2 → A3. To hide the identity of a user in a certificate chain,
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we can assume each user belongs to a group and use group signatures. Since we don’t
have to hide the token issuer’s identity, A1 can issue a certificate signing A2’s group
public key with his secret key, yielding CertA1(pkA
G
2 ), where A2 belongs to group A
G
2 .
When A2 transfers the token to A3, he can prove that he is part of group A
G
2 by












allows A3, who is part of the group A
G
3 to prove he has a valid token. When A3 wants
to further transfer the token to A4 he can reveal this certificate chain. A4 only gets
to know that the original issuer of the token is A1, and that some member of group
AG2 transferred the token to A3. He no longer gets to know the identity of A2. This
scheme seems to capture the transfer path in a privacy preserving manner except for
one problem. A4 may transfer the token back to A2 as he does not know that A2











4 )), due to the uniqueness of the
embedded information in the token(for example, the serial number), A2 knows this is
the same token that he transferred to A3. Due to the deterministic nature of the way
the token grows in size (this cannot be avoided[52]), A2 also knows that this token has
undergone only one transfer and therefore knows A3 → A4, again a loss in privacy. In
addition, for group signatures, clients have the overhead of creating sub groups and
electing group managers. We could use ring signatures but since members of a ring
need not voluntarily participate, the trustworthiness of a transfer path significantly
degrades. We could avoid using groups or rings completely by using a zero knowledge
(ZK) proof system to hide the identity of previous owners of a token. However, just
like the group signature scheme, when a previous owner of a token sees the token
again, he will be able to glean private interaction information. Detecting a cycle is
impossible as a privacy preserving solution cannot reveal previous owners of a token.
However, if cycle detection is impossible then we need to limit the maximum number
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MAC/DS X X X X
Certificate X X X X
Group Sign. X X X X
E-Cash X X X X
DAC X X X X
Our scheme X X X X
of hops that a token can be transferred. An added requirement to our token scheme is
that, in order to avoid looping in a cycle forever, the scheme should be able to restrict
the number of hops.
The occurrence of cycles in a token transfer path forms the hardest challenge in
determining a scheme that satisfies our goals. For a token to not leak privacy, we
observe that all the information it carries must be sufficiently randomized at each
transfer such that a user who has seen a token previously cannot identify it when it
is transferred to him again (unlinkability). The inadequacy of the schemes discussed
above along with two other possibilities, DACs and E-Cash (discussed in section 4.3)
is summarized in table 2. Going forward we show how combining DACs and E-Cash
gives us a mechanism to satisfy all the properties required by our token scheme.
4.3 Building Blocks
4.3.1 Delegatable Anonymous Credentials
Delegatable anonymous credentials (DACs) is a cryptographic mechanism to delegate
access rights repeatedly without revealing the identity of the participants. DACs
provide similar functionality as a certificate chain but do not reveal the identity of
the intermediate entities of the chain. Towards achieving this, Belinkiy et. al.[36]
propose an authentication scheme that creates a tag that authenticates a vector of
messages under a secret key. For example, user A1 can authenticate a set of messages,
~m under his secret key skA1 . If ~m includes the secret key of another user A2, sk
A2 , the
tag becomes a user certificate from A1 to A2. The scheme is summarized by the set
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Table 3: DAC Cheat Sheet
Algorithm Name Description
AuthSetup(1k) Generates groups G1, G2, GT of prime order p whose bit
length is proportional to k, a bilinear map e : G1 ×
G2 → GT , and group elements g, u, u∗, u1, · · · , un ∈ G1 and
h ∈ G2. It outputs the complete parameter list parA =
(G1, G2, e, p, g, u, u∗, u1, · · · , un, h).
AuthKg(parA) Generates sk
$← Zp and pk ← hsk, and returns (sk, pk).
Auth(sk, ~m = (m1, · · · ,mn), parA) Generates K∗,K1, · · · ,Kn
$← Zp. It outputs an au-













Ki+mi }1≤i≤n). The authenticator is used to
prove that ~m is authenticated under secret key sk. The need
for intermediate keys K∗,K1, · · · ,Kn and the properties of
this authentication mechanism can be found in [36].
VerifyAuth(pk, ~m = (m1, · · · ,mn), authsk→~m, parA) Parses authsk→~m = (A∗, B∗, C∗, {Ai, Bi, Ci, Di}1≤i≤n and
verifies {e(A∗, pk ·B∗)·e(g, h−1) = 1∧e(u∗, B∗)·e(C∗, h−1) =
1 ∧1≤i≤n (e(Di, Bihmi ) · e(g, h−1) = 1)}. Returns 1, if all
equations match, else 0.
of algorithms shown in table 3. Using Auth, a user A1 can authenticate the secret key
of user A2. However, since A2’s secret key should not be revealed to A1, they carry
out a secure two party computation (2PC) of the authentication scheme between A1
and A2, shown below:
2PCAuth(I(skI , {mi}1≤i≤l),O(pkI , {mi}1≤i≤n)) is a secure two party computation
between an authentication issuer I and a message owner O such that I does not get
any information about (mi)l+1≤i≤n as well as {g
1
Ki+mi }l+1≤i≤n.
At the end of 2PCAuth, A2 possesses an authenticator auth
A1→A2 from A1, which
is essentially a certificate on his secret key. Such an authenticator itself is unchanging
and therefore reveals the identity of a user. The DAC system uses the notion of user
pseudonyms to get around this. In pseudonym systems[105], a user has a single secret
key but multiple public keys. User A2 who has a secret key sk
A2 , can choose a random
value o and use the commitment Commit(skA2 , o) as a public key. Different values of
o result in different public keys or pseudonyms for the same user. A2 can be known
to user A1 with public key pk
A2 and to user A3 with public key pk
′A2 . Though an
adversary cannot link pkA2 and pk′A2 , user A2 can prove that they are actually com-
mitments to the same secret. In this case, A1 rather than provide the authenticator
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directly, provides a non interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof for the authentica-
tor, πA1→A2 authenticating the contents of pseudonym pkA2 . The NIZK proof system
used is the Groth Sahai proof system[78] which allows the proofs to be (re)randomized
everytime they are presented. When A2 wants to delegate his access right to A3,
he randomizes the pseudonym, proof pair (pkA2 , πA1→A2) to (pk′A2 , π′A1→A2) where
π′A1→A2 authenticates the contents of pk′A2 . The new pseudonym, proof pair can be
further randomized by users who don’t know the underlying contents. This allows
user A3 to once again randomize the credential while delegating to another user A4
and this ensures that the credential changes each time it is transferred, thus providing
strong unlinkability guarantees. The same procedure is followed between each pair of
users. Specifically, A2 will also use its secret key sk
A2 to provide an NIZK proof of
an authenticator for A3’s secret key sk
A3 , πA1→A2 , which again can be randomized.
A3’s credential will then be (π
′A1→A2 , πA2→A3) and will be completely unlinkable to
the credential that A2 had, (π
A1→A2).
Though DACs provide the desirable level of anonymity, the credentials are not
single use. When access rights are delegated to a user, the user can repeatedly
delegate the rights to any number of other users. If we used just the DAC system in
the VoIP setting, a user who has a token can transfer it to a large number of other
users, all of whom can call the token issuer, which is undesirable. In addition, once a
user has a token, he can reuse it multiple times, regardless of the issuer’s interaction
experiences with that user. To address this we need to extend DACs to create single
use tokens.
4.3.2 E-Cash
Electronic cash refers to mechanisms that allow coins to be exchanged electronically.
Typically e-cash schemes contain three entities, the bank, the user and the merchant.
The user withdraws coins from the bank and spends them at a merchant who then
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deposits the coins at the bank. Like all digital data, coins can be copied and hence e-
cash schemes provide a mechanism to prevent double spending. Camenisch et. al.[47]
introduced the first efficient anonymous e-cash scheme that identified double spenders
without needing the bank to be online for each transaction. To illustrate their e-cash
scheme, suppose a bank has a key pair (skB, pkB = g(skB)), where g is a generator of
some group G of prime order p. Similarly, the user has key pair (skU , pkU = g(skU)).
A user on coin withdrawal from a bank receives a signature on a set of values (skU ,
s, t) where s, t
$← Zp. s is the seed for the serial number and t is the seed for the
double spending equation. The serial number is of the form S ← g
1
s+x , where x ∈ Zp.
The double spending equation for a coin is of the form T ← pkU · g
r
s+x , where r
$← Zp
is chosen by the merchant. If a user U double spends the coin and the merchant(s)
chooses two random values r1 and r2 for each of the transactions then the two double
spending equations T1 ← pkU · g
r1
s+x and T2 ← pkU · g
r2
s+x reveal the identity of the





r2−r1 = pkU .
As seen in table 2, DACs satisfy all our requirements except for allowing single use
tokens. The most recent transferable E-Cash scheme[47] uses meta proof techniques
which are inefficient. In our scheme, we use serial number and tags from E-Cash to
extend DACs and create single use tokens that satisfy all our goals.
4.4 Single Use Anonymous Transferable Token Scheme
A token contains three integral components: (i) the identity of the token issuer, (ii)
transfer/call path information, (iii) information that ensures single use and double
spender identification. DACs allow us to create tokens where (i) and (ii) satisfy the
necessary properties: unforgeablity, verifiablity, privacy and efficiency. To satisfy (iii),
in addition to creating single use tokens, we need to ensure the token continues to
be unlinkable and therefore privacy preserving. To do this we use techniques from
E-Cash to create serial number and tags to make single use tokens. We then show
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how these can be made privacy preserving.
4.4.1 Cryptographic Preliminaries
We use the DAC authentication scheme, E-Cash and ElGamal encryption to meet
the different requirements of the token framework. These constructs require common
parameters, described in ParamGen, that are shared across all users. The clients also
need to generate a set of keys for different parts of the scheme, and this is described
in KeyGen.
• ParamGen(1k) is probabilistic algorithm that outputs the common parameters for
the token scheme, parTS. It runs AuthSetup(1k)(section 4.3.1) to get parA. Then
it generates ḡ ∈ G1 and h̄ ∈ G2 for the ElGamal encryption. It returns parTS =
(parA, ḡ, h̄). These common parameters are shared by all users of the system and are
used for all the token operations.
• KeyGen(parTS) is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs the key pair for a user, Ai,
(skAi , pkAi) and is run by each user after they obtain the common parameters. This
algorithm parses parTS and uses parA to generate (sk′Ai , pk′Ai1 ) ← AuthKg(parA)
(section 4.3.1). Remember pk′Ai1 ← h(sk
′Ai
1 ). It then computes another public key,
pk′Ai2 ← usk
′Ai (∈ G1). The token issue protocol uses these keys. The algorithm then
generates s̄k









. These keys are used for ElGamal encryption whenever Ai is a token issuer.








In our setting, the token issuer acts like an E-Cash bank. Since, each user is a bank,
the situation is analogous to a user behaving like a country with its own currency.
As described in E-Cash, the first step in generating the serial number and tags is
generating the seeds for them. In the basic DAC scheme, the message vector that
an issuer A1 authenticates contains the secret key of the token recipient, A2. To this
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message vector we now add seeds for the serial number and the tags as shown in figure
10. Specifically, A1 authenticates the message vector ~m
A2 = {sk′A2 , sA2 , rA2 , t̂A2 , ťA2}
with his secret key sk′A2 . sA2 is the seed for the serial number and rA2 , t̂A2 , ťA2 are
seeds for the tags. This entire procedure essentially forms token issue, at the end of
which user A2 obtains an NIZK proof for the above authenticator from A1. A2 then
calculates the serial number as S ← g
1
sk′A2+sA2 . Since the serial number is a function
of sk′A2 and sA2 , A2 can prove that it was formed only with secrets authenticated by
the token issuer, A1.
In E-Cash, tags are used to identify a user who tries to double spend a coin(same
serial number). These tags need to be created everytime a coin is transferred. A user
initiating a token transfer creates partial tags and the user receiving the token com-
pletes the tags such that if the same token was transferred twice, the two completed
tags are different enough to yield the token duplicator’s identity. Unlike E-Cash, we
need two sets of tags to determine a double spender for the cases when: a) the token is
double spent to two different users, and b) the token is double spent to the same user.
Consider the first time an issued token is transferred. In Figure 10, when A2 transfers





T̂A22 ← pk′A22 · (T̂A21 )r
A2 and ŤA2 ← g
1
sk′A2+ťA2 . In order to make sure that A2 does not
double spend, A3 completes the tags by generating a random number, r
A3 and then
calculating T̂11 ← T̂A22 · (T̂A21 )sk
′A3 , T̂12 ← pk′A31 · Cr
A2 , Ť11 ← pk′A22 · (ŤA2)r
A3 , and
Ť12 ← hr








To see why this is the case, consider a user Ai who transfers the same token to
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both Aj and Ak.
For Aj ,
T̂l1 ← pk′Ai2 · (T̂
Ai
1 )
sk′Aj +rAi T̂l2 ← (h)sk
′Aj +rAi
For Ak ,
T̂ ′l1 ← pk′Ai2 · (T̂
Ai
1 )
sk′Ak+rAi T̂ ′l2 ← (h)sk
′Ak+rAi
Note that the random values, rA2 , t̂A2 , ťA2 used to generate the token tags will be
the same when Ai transfers the token to both Aj and Ak. Plugging in these values























From this, pkDS = pk′Ai2 and thus, Ai will be correctly identified as the double
spender. This explains the need for the first set of tags, T̂l1 and T̂l2. The second set
of tags helps catch the token double spender if he transfers the same token twice to
the same user. This is useful, as users never need to store the details of a token once
they have transferred it. In this case, consider the user Ai who transfers the same







′Aj +rAi ). On the other hand, the second set of tags, (Ťl1, Ťl2) will be different
as Aj generates a new random number, r
Aj for each token transfer. In this case a
similar equation to equation 2 can be used to identify Ai as the double spender, and
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Figure 10: Single Use Anonymous Transferable Token Scheme. Question marks are
used to indicate that an identity has been anonymized.
As shown in figure 10, after the first transfer, the token contains, a serial number
and the tags representing the first transfer. When this token needs to be trans-
ferred again (second transfer), the serial number and tags need to be randomized.
In addition, the issuer, A1 needs to be able to retrieve the original serial number
and the tags, to detect and catch a double spender. To satisfy these requirements,
we encrypt the serial number and tags with the public key of the issuer, p̄k
A1 , a
technique introduced in [48]. As shown in figure 10, when A3 transfers the token




A1(Ť12)), the two sets being unlinkable with each other. The se-
rial number and tags can be encrypted each time, maintaining the unlinkability of
tokens. We use the ElGamal encryption as the token issuer requires a single decryp-
tion operation even if the contents (serial number and tags) are encrypted multiple
times. Specifically, EncA1(S) ← ((p̄kA12 )r̄1 · S, ḡr̄1), EncA1(T̂11) ← ((p̄k
A1
2 )





r̄3 · S, ḡr̄3), EncA1(Ť11) ← ((p̄k
A1
2 )




r̄5 · S, ḡr̄5), where r̄1, · · · , r̄5
$← Zp.
Encrypting the serial number and tags makes it hard to check if they have been
generated correctly. To resolve this, we attach the ZK proofs that show that the
encrypted serial number and tags are generated correctly. For example, for EncA1(S)
whose first term is of the form P ·S, A3 generates commitments of P and S, CP and
CS respectively. It creates a proof to shows CP and CS have been generated correctly
and a proof that the multiplication of CP and CS is the commitment to P ·S. Similar
proofs are generated for the other encrypted values. Using the Groth Sahai proof
system[78] we concatenate all of the proofs generated, into one final proof, πEnc1 . We
note that the authenticator information also shown in figure 10 is randomized using
DACs as discussed in section 4.3.1
Finally for transfers beyond the second transfer, the first set of serial number
and tags needs to be randomized again to preserve unlinkability. The ciphertexts
encrypting the serial number and tags after the second transfer are of the form (A =
(ḡx)r ·m,B = ḡr), where ḡx is the public key of the decryptor. Then a user who has
the ciphertext and the decryptor’s public key can re-encrypt it again by computing
((ḡx)r
′ · A, ḡr′ · B). We can then modify the commitments and the proofs according
to the new random value r′ using the Groth Sahai proof system[78].
The above discussion shows how the serial number for the token and double
spender tags to catch user A2 can be created and randomized at each transfer. How-
ever we need to create tags for each new user in the transfer path. When A3 decides
to transfer the token we need to create similar tags for him too. In this case, A2
creates an authenticator for A3’s secret key and the the tag seeds as shown in figure
10. The randomization procedure for these new tags is exactly similar. This con-
cludes the token transfer operation. Submitting a token involves randomizing all the
components of the token and submitting it to the issuer. There is no need to carry
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out the DAC authentication scheme in this case.
Our construction is almost complete except for one final subtlety. In the DAC
setting, users have one secret key and many public keys. In order to catch double
spenders we need to have at least one of these public keys registered with a certificate
authority (CA). In VoIP systems, the authentication server of VoIP providers like
Skype, Google Talk and Vonage can play the role of the CA. In fact, in Skype, user
accounts are already associated with a public key, which they use for communication.
We, however, need a new certificate issuing protocol because a conventional certifi-
cate reveals the identity of the certificate holder and we need one that reveals the
identity only in direct interaction with a user and when the user behaves dishonestly
(for example, double spends a token). To do this we can once again use the DAC au-
thentication scheme with a CA providing an NIZK proof of an authenticator for each
user as shown in figure 10. A user on transferring a token also adds his certificate.
Since this certificate can also be randomized it continues to maintain unlinkability of
the token. On randomization the certificate no longer reveals the identity of the user
but only shows that the certificate has been generated by the CA.
With this knowledge, the components of a token are (see figure 10): (1) the
identity of the token issuer, (2) randomized certificates for all users so far in the
transfer path, (3) a chain of DAC NIZK proof of authenticators which validates the
actual transfer/call path information, and (4) randomized serial number information
+ randomized tag information for all previous transfers + tag information for the
current transfer. Other than the identity of the token issuer, the remaining content of
the token is randomizable everytime it is transferred. To summarize, our construction
provides a way to (a) use the DAC authentication scheme to create certificates and
generate seeds for the serial number and double spender tags, (b) create serial number
and tags from these seeds, (c) identify a double spender, and (d) randomize the serial
number and tag information at each transfer.
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4.4.3 Scheme Definition
We formalize the algorithms that define our token scheme as follows:
• ParamGen(1k) is probabilistic algorithm that outputs the system parameters
parTS.
• KeyGen(parTS) is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs the key pair of user,
Ai: (sk
Ai ,pkAi). This pair represents all the keys that are generated.
• IssueToken(A1(skA1 , pkA2), A2(skA2 , pkA1)) is an interactive protocol where A1
issues a token to A2. After this protocol ends, A1 gets either its view V issueA1 or
⊥, and A2 gets either a token TokenA10 or ⊥.
• TransferToken(Ai(skAi , pkA1 , pkAi+1 ,TokenA1i−2),
Ai+1(sk
Ai+1 , pkA1 , pkAi)) is an interactive protocol between Ai and Ai+1. pk
A1
is the public key of the issuer of TokenA1i−2’. At the end, Ai has its view V transferAi
or ⊥, and Ai+1 has either a token TokenA1i−1 or ⊥.
• SubmitToken(Ak+1(skAk+1 , pkA1 ,TokenA1k−1),
A1(sk
A1 , pkAk+1 , DA1)) is an interactive protocol between Ak+1 and A1. A1 will
accept TokenA1k−1 if it was correctly issued by A1 and has never been submitted
before. DA1 represents A1’s token database. At the end of this protocol, Ak+1
gets either its view VsubmitAk+1 or ⊥, and A1 gets either an updated list D
′A1 , or
two tokens TokenA1k+1 and Token
A1
l which have the same serial number, or ⊥.
• Identify(TokenA1l ,Token
A1
l′ ) is a deterministic algorithm. If both Token
A1
l and
TokenA1l′ come from the same Token
A1
0 , it outputs the public key of the token
double spender. Otherwise it returns ⊥.
• VerifyGuilt(pkAi ,Π) is a deterministic algorithm which outputs 0 if Π is a correct
proof that the owner of pkAi double spent the token, or 1 otherwise.
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Theorem 4.4.1 Protocols ParamGen, KeyGen, IssueToken, TransferToken, SubmitToken,
Identify, and VerifyGuilt achieve correctness, unforgeability, double spender identifica-
tion and anonymity assuming HSDH, BB− HSDH, BB− CDH, and SXDH
Most of the proofs follow from the underlying schemes, namely DAC and e-cash,
except anonymity. We need to define a new anonymity game analogous to the one
in [48]. In Canard et. al.[48], the adversary, Adv runs the e-cash credential transfer
protocol (spending protocol) with a challenged user ib, where b could be either 0 or 1,
and has to determine b. In our case, since the identity of a user is known in a direct
interaction, Adv can easily win the same game. We, therefore, modify the game such
that the challenged user ib runs the token transfer protocol with an intermediate user
Aj first. Aj, then, transfers it to Adv, who then tries to determine b. This game
captures the concept of interaction anonymity where the concern is the privacy of
previous interactions.
4.5 Security Evaluation
4.5.1 Algorithms and protocols
We formalize and summarize the algorithms described in the previous sections as
follows:
• ParamGen(1k) is probabilistic algorithm that outputs the system parameters
parTS.
• KeyGen(parTS) is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs the key pair of user,
Ai: (sk
Ai ,pkAi). This pair represents all the keys that are generated.
• IssueToken(A1(skA1 , pkA2), A2(skA2 , pkA1)) is an interactive protocol where A1
issues a token to A2. After this protocol ends, A1 gets either its view V issueA1 or
⊥, and A2 gets either a token TokenA10 or ⊥.
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• TransferToken(Ai(skAi , pkA1 , pkAi+1 ,TokenA1i−2), Ai+1(skAi+1 , pkA1 , pkAi)) is an in-
teractive protocol between Ai and Ai+1. pk
A1 is the public key of the issuer of
TokenA1i−2’. At the end, Ai has its view V transferAi or ⊥, and Ai+1 has either a token
TokenA1i−1 or ⊥.
• SubmitToken(Ak+1(skAk+1 , pkA1 ,TokenA1k−1), A1(skA1 , pkAk+1 , DA1)) is an interac-
tive protocol between Ak+1 and A1. A1 will accept Token
A1
k−1 if it was correctly
issued by A1 and has never been submitted before. D
A1 represents A1’s token
database. At the end of this protocol, Ak+1 gets either its view VsubmitAk+1 or ⊥,
and A1 gets either an updated list D
′A1 , or two tokens TokenA1k+1 and Token
A1
l
which have the same serial number, or ⊥.
• Identify(TokenA1l ,Token
A1
l′ ) is a deterministic algorithm. If both Token
A1
l and
TokenA1l′ come from the same Token
A1
0 , it outputs the public key of the token
double spender. Otherwise it returns ⊥.
• VerifyGuilt(pkAi ,Π) is a deterministic algorithm which outputs 0 if Π is a correct
proof that the owner of pkAi double spent the token, or 1 otherwise.
4.5.2 Correctness
We say a token submit is correct if an honest issuer gets an updated database as part
of running protocol SubmitToken with the token submitter, only when the submitter
submits a valid token. We say that a token issue and token transfer are correct
if a honest user gets a valid token by running IssueToken or TransferToken protocol
respectively, such that the token can be submitted or transferred and the submitter
on running SubmitToken with the issuer, will never have the issuer outputting ⊥.
4.5.3 Security and anonymity
This section shows the security and anonymity model that any token transfer scheme
needs to satisfy. It then provides the security proofs of our token transfer scheme
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under this model.
4.5.3.1 Definition of oracles
We follow a similar approach as [48]. Suppose that the parameter parTS is given
to the oracles. All the users’ public keys and secret keys are initially created and
managed by the oracles in databases PK and SK. They also manage the set of views
of tokens. There are three tables IT, OT and ST. The tokens issued from the oracles
are stored in IT, those issued to, or transferred from or to the oracles in OT, and
those submitted to the oracles in ST. To evaluate the security of our scheme we use
the following oracles:
• OCreateUser(i) executes KeyGen(parTS ) and stores the output public key pkAi
in PK[i] and the secret key skAi in SK[i].
• OCorrupt(i) outputs skAi and sets SK[i] = ⊥. When an adversary executes this
oracle he gets all of Ai’s tokens. After this protocol is run, the adversary can
act as Ai as well as any of the other users that he has corrupted.
• OIssueI(pkA1 , pkA2) runs IssueToken protocol playing the token issuer. The ad-
versary should have the secret key skA2 to execute this oracle. The oracle stores
V issueA1 in IT[1].
• OIssueU(pkA1 , pkA2) runs IssueToken playing the token receiver, A2’s side. The
adversary should have skA1 to execute this oracle. The oracle stores the resulting
token in OT[2]
• OIssueI&U(pkA1 , pkA2) runs IssueToken protocol playing both the token issuer
and receiver. If the result of the protocol is V issueA1 and Token
A1
0 , they are stored
in IT[1] and OT[2], respectively. The adversary should have neither skA1 nor
skA2 .
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• OTransferS(pkAi ,TokenA1i−2, pkAi+1) runs TransferToken protocol playing the user
who is transferring the token. The adversary should have secret key skAi+1 to
execute this oracle. If OT[i] does not have the token, the protocol is aborted. If
the protocol is successful then TokenA1i−2 is removed from OT[i] and sent to the
adversary. OT[i] is updated with the view V transferAi .
• OTransferR(pkAi ,TokenA1i−2, pkAi+1) runs TransferToken protocol playing the to-
ken receiver, Ai+1’s side. The adversary should have sk
Ai and TokenA1i−2 be-
fore executing this oracle. If the protocol completes successfully, the resulting
TokenA1i−1 is stored in OT[i+ 1].
• OTransferS&R(pkAi ,TokenA1i−2, pkAi+1) runs TransferToken protocol playing both
sides. If OT[i] does not have the token, the protocol is aborted. Otherwise,
after running the protocol, TokenA1i−2 is removed from OT[i] and sent to Ai+1.
TokenA1i−1 is now stored in OT[i+1]. Ai’s output, V
transfer
Ai
is now stored in OT[i].
• OSubmitS(pkAk+1 ,TokenA1k−1, pkA1) runs SubmitToken protocol playing Ak+1. The
adversary should have skA1 to execute this oracle. If the protocol is not aborted
OT[k + 1] is updated with Ak+1’s view of the protocol, VsubmitAk+1 . If SubmitToken
outputs TokenA1l ,Token
A1




k−1, ) and outputs the
resulting public key.
• OSubmitR(pkAk+1 ,TokenA1k−1, pkA1) runs SubmitToken protocol playing the is-
suer’s side. The adversary should have both TokenA1k−1 and sk
Ak+1 to run this
oracle. skA1 should not belong to the adversary. It updates ST if the proto-





k−1, ) and outputs the resulting public key.
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4.5.3.2 Unforgeability
As in [48], the unforgeability requirement reduces to the fact that any set of users
should not be able to spend more tokens than those issued or transferred to them.
Game. Suppose an adversary Adv is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing Ma-
chine that has access to all of the user’s public keys in PK and parTS ← ParamGen(1k).
Adv can play with the oracles OCreateUser, OCurrupt, OIssueI, OIssueI&U, OTransferS,
OTransferR, OTransferS&R and OSubmitR, as many times as he wants. Adv wins the
game if qI +qR < qS where qI is the number of successful queries to the oracle OIssueI,
qR is the number of successful queries to the oracle OTransferS, and qS is the number
of successful queries to the oracle OTransferR.
Theorem 4.5.1 The proposed scheme is unforgeable.
Proof: Suppose the adversary, Adv succeeds in forging a token in the unforgeability
game. This means Adv produces at least one new token that is acceptable by the
oracle OTransferR. Based on the number of transfers that the token has undergone,
we can divide this into three cases. If the new token is a directly issued token, then
the entire token is essentially a delegatable anonymous credential. The existence of
the new token means breaking F-unforgeability[36], which is a contradiction based
on the computational assumption in [36]. If the new token has undergone a single
transfer then it consists of the delgatable anonymous credential, a serial number, and
a tag. The existence of the new token then breaks F-unforgeability, or violates the
weak BB assumption [39]. Based on the assumptions in [36], this is infeasible. The
final case is where the new token has undergone more than one transfer. In this case,
the new token is a GS-NIZK proof. Because of the extractability of the GS-NIZK
proof, we can extract the witness of the proof. Thus, like the second case, we can show
that this means breaking the F-unforgeability or violating the weak BB assumption.
Therefore, the proposed scheme is unforgeable.
59
4.5.3.3 Anonymity
For the token scheme to be privacy preserving, in our setting, we need it to have
strong anonymity guarantees. In this section we define the exact anonymity require-
ments, and call it interaction anonymity. We define the interaction anonymity game
analogous to the one in [48]. In [48], the adversary, Adv runs the e-cash credential
transfer protocol (spending protocol) with a challenged user ib, where b could be ei-
ther 0 or 1, and has to determine b. In our case, since the identity of a user is known
in a direct interaction, Adv can easily win the same game. We, therefore, modify
the game such that the challenged user ib runs the token transfer protocol with an
intermediate user Aj first. Aj, then, transfers it to Adv, who tries to determine b.
This game captures the concept of interaction anonymity where the concern is the
privacy of previous interactions. We have previously used A∗ to define all our users.
We use i0 and i1 to maintain a similar notation as [48], enabling us to highlight the
difference between the two anonymity games. i0 and i1 could represent any two users.





2 SK, PK, IT, OT, and ST are created.
3 pki0 , pki1 , pkAj ,TokenA1 ,Token′A1
$← AdvSetofOracles,
where SK[1] 6= ⊥, SK[j] 6= ⊥, SK[i0] 6= ⊥, SK[i1] 6= ⊥.
TokenA1 ,Token′A1 have the same length.
4 Suppose TokenA1 belongs to Am, and Token
′A1 belongs to An,
where both users could be corrupted by Adv.
OTransferR(pkAm , pki0 ,TokenA1) and OTransferR(pkAn , pki1 ,Token′A1) are executed.
5 b
$← {0, 1} and OTransferS&R(pkib , pkAj) is executed.
6 OTransferS(pkAj , pkA
Adv
) is executed, where AAdv can be any user who is corrupted by Adv.
7 b′ ← AdvSetofOracles′
8 If b = b′ return 1. Else, return 0.
(*)Adv cannot use OSubmitR more than once for each token
TokenA1 and Token′A1 through the whole experiment,
even when they are transferred to other users controlled by oracles.
(*) SetofOracles means Adv can play with all the oracles.
(*) SetofOracles′ means Adv can play with all oracles except
OTransferS(pki0 ,TokenA1 , ·), OTransferS(pki1 ,Token′A1·),
OSubmitS(pki0 ,TokenA1 , A1), and OSubmitS(pk
i1 ,Token′A1 , A1) are not allowed.
In the above game, the following inequality should hold for a scheme if it has to
meet interaction anonymity :
|Pr[Gameanonymity(1k) = 1]− Pr[Gameanonymity(1k) = 0]| < 1
p(k)
Theorem 4.5.2 The proposed scheme preserves interaction anonymity.
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Proof: From the anonymity experiment, the token has undergone at least 3 transfers
after which the adversary, Adv needs to determine whether i0 or i1 owned it previously.
This means that the token is composed of GS-Proofs, a serial number, and tags. The
serial number and tags are encrypted with the issuer’s public key. The harder case
is if the adversary has seen the token before, by corrupting users Am and An. Since
the GS-proofs are randomized [36], and the serial number and tags are re-encrypted
with a new random number at every transfer, both of which ensure unlinkability,
Adv cannot link the token that he obtains to any of the tokens that he previously
owned. More precisely speaking, the randomizability of GS-proofs[78] shows that
the randomized GS-proof cannot be distinguishable from a simulated GS-proof that
is generated based on simulated parameters even though the adversary knows the
trapdoor information of the proof. This means the GS-proofs that were part of the
token owned by the Adv are unlinkable to the GS-proof in the token that he obtains
at the end of the experiment. As far as the serial number and tags are concerned, any
of the re-encrypted Elgamal ciphertexts are indistinguishable from the two random
element tuple (gr1 , gr2), where r1, r2
$← Zq based on DDH assumption. Therefore, the
serial number and tags previously seen by the adversary are unlinkable to the ones
that are part of the token that he obtains at the end of the experiment. The proposed
scheme therefore preserves interaction anonymity.
4.5.3.4 Identification of double spender
No user can double spend or transfer a token twice without revealing his identity. We
define this requirement through the following game:
Game. Let an adversary Adv be a polynomial probabilistic Turing Machine that
has access to all of the users’ public keys in PK and parTS. Adv can play any number of
times with all of the oracles. Then Adv chooses a challenge token Token that belongs
to one of the users that he has corrupted, Ai. After that, Adv uses Token twice
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using either OTransferR or OSubmitR. Adv can again play with all of the oracles any
number of times. Adv wins the game if, on running OSubmitR, the Submit protocol
outputs Token′, T oken′′, where both tokens come from Token, and the output of
Idenitfy(Token′, T oken′′) is not a public key whose secret key is ⊥ in SK.
Theorem 4.5.3 The proposed scheme identifies double spenders.
Proof: We divide the double spending into two cases. The first case is where a
user Ai transfers his token to two different users, Am and An. Am and An use their
public keys to make the first set of tags (T̂l1, T̂l2). Therefore, these two tags are
different ensuring that when the issuer receives both these tokens, no matter how
many transfers the tokens have undergone, the double spending will be detected as
shown in equation 2. The only way the tags are not different is if Am and An use
the same public key, which is not possible, as for them to be regarded as different
entities, their (registered) public keys should be different from each other. If they are
the same entity the situation is considered in the next case.
The second case is if Ai transfers the same token twice, as the receiving user does
not have access to the serial number of the token he receives. In this case, the second
set of tags (Ťl1, Ťl2) for the two copies of the double spent token are different as the
receiving user will use a different random number for each interaction. When these
tokens are submitted to the issuer, (Ťl1, Ťl2) will reveal the double spender, Ai as
shown in equation 3. Ai can transfer the token to another user corrupted by Adv, Aj
who uses the same random number for both interactions. Aj will then transfer these
tokens to some other set of users. However when these tokens are submitted to the
issuer, Aj will instead be caught as the double spender.
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4.6 Implementation and Evaluation
Our scheme is built on recent cryptographic primitives (DAC - Crypto 2009 and the
underlying GS Proof System - Crypto 2008), and we are not aware of implementations
that exist for them. We, therefore, first built these primitives, in C, on top of the PBC
library[24] which performs pairing based mathematical operations. We use type ’D’
MNT curves with group order of 159-bit length. We then implemented the different
algorithms of our token scheme on top of these primitives. Since the token scheme
implements several cryptographic primitives, we first study it’s performance with
respect to the time taken and the message lengths (network bandwidth) generated
by each of its protocols.
4.6.1 Operation Costs
Startup Costs: From a cryptographic standpoint there are two primary entities in
our system, the certificate authority (CA) and the user (client). Each of these entities
on startup perform a particular set of operations. The CA on startup generates
common parameters and then generates it’s keys using these common parameters. A
client on startup obtains the common parameters from the CA, generates its keys and
finally gets them certified by the CA. The cost of each of these startup operations
were measured on an Intel Xeon 5160 with a 3 GHz processor. Each operation was
run 10 times and the mean and standard deviation values were calculated and the
results are shown in figures 11 and 12. Figure 11 shows the time taken by each
operation, and figure 12 measures the lengths of messages that need to be passed
over the network (bandwidth utilized). Generating the common parameters includes
generating the bilinear groups and all the group generators as described in ParamGen
in section 4.4.1. From the figures, the block marked Common Parameter Generation
shows that it takes around 240 ms to generate these parameters and they can be



































Figure 11: Time - Operation Preliminaries.
startup contact the CA to obtain this 4 KB message and use it to generate their
secret keys and their public keys, (sk′Ai , pk′Ai) and (s̄k
Ai , p̄k
Ai) as described in the
algorithm KeyGen in section 4.4.1. The key generation is a costly operation as seen
in the block marked Key Generation and takes on average ≈ 7 s with a standard
deviation of ≈ 5 s. At this point the CA is done with its startup costs.
The clients still need to certify their public keys pk′Ai , from the CA. Towards
this, the client and the CA engage in a 2PC protocol for creating the NIZKPK proof
of the authenticator [36]. In figures 11 and 12, Certificate Issue Protocol shows the
time taken and the lengths of the messages exchanged between the client and the
CA are shown in the block marked Certificate Issue Protocol. All the messages are
under 2KB, and the overall time of the operation notwithstanding network latencies
is roughly .5 s. After this, the clients are ready interact with each other either issuing,
transferring or submitting tokens. The total startup time for a client on average is
≈ 8 s.
Cost of Token Operations: After the one time startup cost, clients can engage
in token issue, transfer and submit. The token issue protocol is a three way exchange












































Figure 12: Length - Operation Preliminaries
authenticating the receiver’s secrets as described in IssueToken. The time taken and
the length of messages generated are depicted by the block Token Issue in figures 11
and 12. A token issue takes on average 1.5 s to complete. Once a token is issued
the receiving client can submit it back or transfer the token further. The cost of
submit or transfer operations varies based on the number of times the token has
been transferred. The length of a token being submitted or transferred based on the
number of previous transfers is shown in figure 14. Belinkiy et. al. [36] were the
first to introduce DACs with proof size that increased linearly in the number of hops
from the token issuer. To that we add E-Cash tags (the serial number is constant
size) which also grow linearly with the number of transfers. Figure 14 corroborates
this showing a linear increase in size of the token based on the number of transfers it
has undergone. Furthermore, the close similarity between the length of a token being
submitted after L transfers (L ≥ 2) and a token being transferred L + 1 hops, is
due to the fact that, in order to submit an L hop transferred token, the owner needs
to randomize the token in the exact fashion as a token transfer. For tokens being
submitted, the token lengths increases by 15KB each transfer. This is important
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Figure 13: Time - Coin Transfer and Submit





















Figure 14: Length - Coin Transfer and Submit
as we plan to use this framework in a VoIP setting where call signaling and call
teardown is performed over both UDP and TCP. In IPv4, for UDP, the maximum
packet size is 65507 which implies for UDP based applications, without splitting the
packets, we restrict ourselves to only allowing 4 hops/3 transfer tokens (size 58 KB).
For UDP, a token can therefore be transferred at most 3 times after which it must
be submitted. We note that the size of the token being submitted when there are no
transfers is significantly lower (≈ 3KB for 0 transfer, compared to ≈ 28KB for 1
transfer) because we optimize away the randomizations and perform them only when
the token is first transferred.
Figure 13 depicts the most significant time activity for token transfers and submits,
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averaged over 10 runs (low variance). When a token is submitted the receiver only
needs to validate the token. On the other hand, when a token is transferred, a 2PC
computation needs to be carried out for generating the authenticator and the double
spending tags. Due to this the overall time taken for token transfer is significantly
more than that of token submit. In figure 13 we see that the time taken for token
submit increases linearly by 1.5 s per hop and that of token transfers by 4 s per hop.
These values will dictate feasibility of the token framework in a particular application
setting. In the next section we discuss the implications of these costs in a VoIP setting
and analyze its performance with respect to a spammer threat model.
4.6.2 Applying The Token Scheme To Prevent VoIP Spam
We assume the call setup and teardown signaling is provided by the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)[127]. For two users to communicate with each other using SIP, they
need to know each other’s SIP Uniform Resource Identifier (similar to an email id).
SIP then uses a three-way handshake mechanism to establish a call and a two way
handshake to teardown a call. We piggyback our token mechanisms on top of the
SIP call signaling messages. We piggyback our token submit protocol on top of the
call setup as users will accept and reject the call based on the token. Token issue
and transfer occur at the end of a successful call and are piggybacked on top of call
teardown. For call setup, E.721[160] recommends an average delay of no more than
3.0, 5.0 or 8.0 s, for local, toll and international calls, with the 95th percentiles set
at 6.0, 8.0 and 11.0 s, respectively. Looking at the token submit times from Figure
13, we see that other than for direct tokens that are submitted (x = 0), token submit
times are greater than 3 s and increase by 1.5 s every hop. This implies that direct
tokens offer acceptable call setup delays while tokens that have undergone one or
two transfers will fall within the 95th percentile. Tokens that have undergone three
transfers (four hops away) and beyond seem to have unacceptable call setup times.
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We, however, note that for callers who are more than three hops away, this might be
a fair penalty to pay to be introduced to a user. VoIP systems like Google Talk use a
Turing Test for all users who are calling for the first time and successfuly completing
the test takes more than the 9 s that our system requires for a user four hops away. In
addition, this serves as a potential deterrent for malicious users who could eventually
obtain tokens after a large number of hops. Furthermore, this is a one time cost, as
after the introduction call, if interactions are favourable then the newly introduced
user will start receiving direct tokens. Nonetheless, taking this and the UDP packet
size limit into account, we only allow up to three transfers (users four hops away) in
this implementation.
During call teardown after a successful call (based on a thresold call duration
value), the caller can decide to either issue a token of his own or transfers another
user’s token. In this chapter, we use a simple strategy to make this decision. Specif-
ically, when user A1 calls user A2, he issues tokens if A2 has lesser than a threshold
number of A1’s tokens, or if A1 does not have sufficient number of tokens of any other
user to transfer. In all other cases, A1 transfers the token of a user from whom it has
collected the maximum number of tokens.
To evaluate the combined system, we setup a simulation with 4 domains, each
serviced by a proxy that handles 50 users, a total of 200 users in the system. In addi-
tion, we have a DNS server, a cryptography server and a statistics server. The DNS
server translates domain names to the correct proxy IP address. The cryptography
server generates the common parameters and doubles up as the CA. The statistics
server calculates statistics including true positives, true negatives, false positives and
false negatives. Initially each client requests the cryptography server for the common
parameters and uses them to generate keys. It gets the keys certified by the CA and
then it is ready to make and receive calls. The distribution with which it makes calls
is dependent on the type of user the client represents. Clients can behave either as
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an honest user or one of two types of spammers: (1) engaging spammers are able to
engage users with a certain probability both when they receive calls and when they
make calls, (2) fleeting association spammers are able to engage users only till the
completion of some activity. Honest users makes calls to other phones with inter call
and call duration values that are Poisson distributed. The choice of call recipient is
Zipfian distributed. Spammers make calls to as many other users as possible. Honest
users issue or transfer tokens based on a threshold call duration strategy. Spammers
issue or transfer tokens to increase the number of spam calls. All spammers are in-
clined to collude with other spammers. In the simulation, 100 s of simulation time is
equivalent to 1 day of real time. Each run lasts 20 days (2000 s).
Choice of Learning Period: The learning period is a duration of time just after
a user is introduced into the system. During this time, the user accepts all calls to
obtain a sizeable starting set of tokens from his SN. These tokens enable the user to
call his SN and also disseminate his tokens so that others can call back. The learning
period ensures that when a honest user is introduced into the system, he becomes
selective about the calls he accepts only when he has a significant supply of tokens
from members of his SN and his SN has a significant supply of his tokens. We assume
that during this learning period spammers do not discover the user and therefore
cannot spam the user. The graph in figure 15 shows the false positive rate (FPR)
for 200 users, all honest, for different initial learning periods. The time axis starts 1
day into the running of the system as this is the minimum learning period that was
used. The stabilized false positive rate shows an exponential drop with increasing
learning periods. For learning periods of 1, 2 and 3 days it is ≈ 11%, ≈ 3%, ≈ 1.7%,
respectively and thereafter stays around ≈ 1.5% for higher learning periods. After
learning periods of 3 days or more, users have a significant supply of tokens and can
obtain tokens of users who are four hops away through the token transfer mechanism,
resulting in a low false positive rate. Shue et. al.[136] studied the onset of spam
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Figure 15: Learning Period - False Positive Rate























Figure 16: Engaging Spammers - True Positive Rate
and found that accounts that post their addresses on less popular websites will be
discovered and receive spam only after 3 days. If we assume this holds for VoIP
addresses too, then as long as users do not aggressively broadcast their addresses,
a learning period of 3 days is feasible and provides a low enough FPR. In addition,
since learning periods of more than 3 days do not reduce the FPR significantly, we
use a 3 day learning period for the rest of the simulations.
Spammers that Engage Users In Conversation: In our system, users issue or
transfer tokens only when a call lasts for more than a threshold duration. Spammers
without the ability to engage users will never get tokens, even if they do manage to
get users to inadvertently call them. However, spammers thrive because some honest
users are fooled into believing the legitimacy of the spam content. To model this,
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we associate with all users a value between 0 and 1 that represents the ability to
engage another user in conversation. This value is set high for honest users and we
configure spammers with various levels of engagability. Based on the engagability of
the spammer, a user will inadvertently either issue or transfer tokens to spammers.
Spammers can collude and therefore can collaboratively glean tokens. Spammers
are introduced into the system immediately after the learning period (3 days). The
results for different values of spammer engagability for a system with 20% spammers
are shown in figure 16. For all cases our token framework is able to achieve a high
sensitivity, of over 99%, in blocking spam calls. Spammers will find it hard to engage
users in conversation and even when they do, the single use tokens only allows a
limited number of calls. On the other hand, an honest user, due to his ability to
carry on a conversation will first receive tokens of his immediate SN, and then receive
tokens from his extended SN. From figure 16, small values of engagability (5%, 10%
and 15%) result in a low false negative rate (FNR) and this rate stabilizes early in
the run. However, spammers with a higher ability to engage users (25%), are able to
make more calls at an ever increasing FNR, largely due to the collusions with other
spammers. For spammers with 25% engagability, the final stabilized FNR was close
to 1% and for 35% the FNR was close to 1.3%.
We also studied the effects of introducing 10% fleeting association spammers who
behave adaptively. When just introduced to a user, they behave legitimately but
soon start spamming the user. Spammers that behaved normally for periods of 1
and 2 days and then started spamming were able to achieve a FNR of ≈ 4.5% and
≈ 17%. These values show that the success of a spammer increases significantly with
the amount of time he is able to behave normally. However, the system reacts quickly
and within a day reduces the FNR to under 10%.
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4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we created a single use transferable token framework that captures
interaction history in a privacy preserving manner by enhancing delegatable anony-
mous credentials. This allows us to prove the existence of a social network path
without revealing the intermediate actors in the path. We show how we can use this
to enhance CallRank by using it in a VoIP setting to prevent VoIP spam while being
privacy preserving. We now broaden our scope and look at ways to create effective
identities across the entire telecommunication landscape.
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CHAPTER V
PINDR0P: USING SINGLE ENDED AUDIO FEATURES
TO DETERMINE CALL PROVENANCE
The current telephony infrastructure allows users to communicate using a variety
of technologies that pass through various providers within PSTN, cellular and VoIP
networks. Each of these telecommunication networks adopt their own set of standards,
from the underlying transport protocols to the codecs used to transmit media. Yet,
they seamlessly interact through a variety of conversion mechanisms. A call may
traverse multiple such networks, taking advantage of the benefits offered by each
before reaching its final destination.
The diversification of telephony infrastructure significantly reduces the integrity
associated with call metadata, such as Caller-ID [2], as it is either not transferred
across these networks or is transferred without verification. This allows easy ma-
nipulation of metadata by hardware and software including soft phones on desktop
computers. For example, between January 21st and 26th of 2010, customers of banks
in four states received calls asking them to reveal personal information including
credit card and PIN details. Many of these attacks use VoIP phones to anonymously
and inexpensively dial a large number of customers while forging the Caller-IDs of
these banks [104].
In this chapter, we develop PinDr0p1, an infrastructure to assist users in deter-
mining the provenance of a call — the source and the path taken by a call. Through
a combination of signal processing and machine learning, we show that regardless of
1Our mechanisms take advantage of audio and path artifacts that, like the sound made by the
drop of a pin, are largely inaudible to the human ear.
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the claimed source, the audio delivered to the receiver exhibits measurable features of
the networks through which the call was delivered. For example, calls that traverse a
VoIP network experience packet loss that results in perceivable effects in the final call
audio. Such artifacts are noticeably absent in calls that have only traversed cellular
or Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs). In particular, the codec trans-
formations applied by multiple intermediary PSTNs, VoIP and cellular networks, in
combination with packet loss and noise characteristics, allow us to develop profiles
for various call sources based solely on features extracted from the received audio.
In the absence of any verifiable metadata, these features offer a means of developing
source fingerprints that help compare and distinguish different incoming calls.
We make the following contributions:
• Identify robust source and network path artifacts extracted purely
from the received call audio: We show that the received call audio provides
extractable features that are strong identifiers of the networks that the call has
traversed, allowing us to determine the provenance of a call. These include
degradations (packet loss in VoIP) and noise characteristics of codecs unique to
each network.
• Develop call provenance classifier architecture: We develop a multi-label
machine learning classifier based on the extracted features to correctly identify
the provenance of an incoming call with 91.6% accuracy with as little as 15
seconds of audio. Because PinDr0p does not rely on metadata available in some
networks (e.g., VoIP) or cryptography, it is more readily deployable across the
diverse devices and networks that make up modern telephony systems.
• Demonstrate our robustness in identifying call provenance for live
calls: We make calls using PSTN phones, cellular phones, Vonage, Skype and
other soft phones from locations across the world and are able to distinguish
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between them with 90% accuracy with only a small sample being labeled. As
we increase the number of such labels we are able to distinguish between these
calls with 100% accuracy. This demonstrates that PinDr0p makes VoIP-based
phishing attacks harder and provides an important first step towards a Caller-ID
alternative.
We note that while our approach does not provide the same guarantees as the
use of end-to-end cryptography, it is also not encumbered with the difficulties of key
distribution, management and the requirement that both endpoints are capable of
such operations. The guarantees provided by our approach are instead more akin to
traceback techniques from IP networks [131]. However, PinDr0p does not mandate
the modification of the core infrastructure to attach additional metadata in-transit
as our provenance information is extracted directly from the received audio. While
adversaries may attempt to modify their attack in order to circumvent PinDr0p (e.g.,
change codecs, replicate the noise profile and change the physical location from which
an attack is launched to match packet loss characteristics), our approach significantly
increases the difficulty of successfully launching such an attack and improves the
chances of identifying an attacker.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 discusses the de-
tails of our proposed call provenance mechanism; Section 5.2 details our experimental
setup and results; Section 5.3 presents experimental results from a real-world attack
scenario; Section 5.4 offers further insight into our scheme and discusses trade-offs
and limitations;
5.1 Call Provenance
The provenance of a call describes the characteristics of the source and traversed net-
works. This information can be used to create fingerprints that help distinguish and
compare different calls in the absence of verifiable end to end metadata. For example,
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provenance can be used to identify if a call has passed through a VoIP network and,
if it has not typically done so, alert the receiver of the change. At the very least,
provenance must be able to distinguish between traffic that has traversed different
telephony networks: PSTN, cellular and VoIP. We investigate whether this can be
achieved with only the audio content available at the receiving end of a call. This ap-
proach is attractive as provenance can be determined without access or modification
to intermediate network elements such as gateways or routers.
As a call traverses multiple networks, the audio is repeatedly re-encoded with the
network’s choice of codec. To illustrate, a Skype call to a landline is initially encoded
using G.729 and re-encoded using G.711 when it encounters the VoIP-PSTN gateway.
If we can extract artifacts of each of the applied codecs from the received audio then
simple codec to network translation (G.729 =⇒ VoIP) determines call provenance.
In addition, identifying the codec used in a particular network helps characterize
that network. However, codecs like G.711 are widely used in both PSTN and VoIP
systems, implying codec detection alone is insufficient. Therefore, we seek additional
differentiators.
Networks themselves introduce degradations into call audio. In VoIP, there are
packet losses which are not seen in circuit switched PSTN networks. Similarly, mobile
phones have bit errors due to fading effects on radio channels. The loss of an entire
packet containing 20 ms of speech is measurably different from a small number of
incorrect bits. These features are more robust than simply extracting codec informa-
tion as packet loss and bit errors are hard for an adversary to control — an adversary
bounded by a lossy connection, many miles away, cannot spoof a lossless, dedicated
PSTN line to a bank.
Solution Overview: To identify and characterize the different networks a call
has traversed, we focus on degradations specific to each network. We first demon-
strate how we can identify and characterize a VoIP network by detecting packet loss
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Figure 17: Packet Loss and Corresponding Energy Drop. The breaks in the signal
(top) that occur due to packet loss are more accurately determined using the short
time energy (bottom) of the signal.
or concealed packet loss in the received audio. We then show how PSTN and cellular
networks can be identified and characterized due to their vastly different noise char-
acteristics. Finally, since the quality of the received audio significantly degrades with
the number of networks traversed, we extract quality specific features. We create
a feature vector that aggregates feature values obtained from the packet loss, noise
and quality measurements and use it to train a multi-label classifier to identify the
networks that a call originated and traversed. In addition, we demonstrate how the
feature vector provides call provenance fingerprints that can be used to consistently
identify a call source.
5.1.1 Identifying VoIP Networks
5.1.1.1 Detecting Packet Loss
Within an IP network a lost packet can be easily identified using the sequence numbers
present in each packet (metadata). However, these sequence numbers are lost once the
call is retransmitted over another telephony network. Accordingly, we must identify
artifacts of these lost packets from the received audio. The top graph in Figure 17
shows two seconds of speech encoded with G.711 and transmitted through a VoIP
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network with a packet loss rate of 5%. The effect of a lost packet is sometimes visibly
identifiable by a break in the waveform (annotated by arrows). However, such loss
can be detected more accurately by determining the short-time average energy of the
signal, as shown in the bottom graph in Figure 17.
Short-time average energy (STE) is traditionally used in speech analysis to detect
words surrounded by pauses as they cause abrupt drops in energy levels. This can
be adapted to detect a packet loss, which also causes an abrupt decrease in energy.





where En is the STE for a window of speech w(n). Specifically, w(n) is a sliding
Hamming window of length N , where the speech samples closer to n are weighted
more than those at the window edge. For the codecs we consider, a packet contains
at least 10 ms of audio represented by 80 samples of speech. By making our window
length less than 80, multiple values of En are completely influenced by a dropped
packet. This results in the breaks in energy shown in Figure 17. We detect packet loss
by looking for a significant drop in energy followed by an energy floor, accompanied
by a significant energy rise.
We note that the presence of all three of these characteristics is necessary to detect
packet loss as each appears individually even in speech that has not experienced
any packet loss. For instance, in Figure 17, we see a significant rise in energy at
approximately 2 seconds due to the start of a speech segment. This is a result of
Voice Activity Detection (VAD) in VoIP systems where packets are only sent during
active speech to reduce bandwidth. Similarly, when a speech segment ends there is
a significant drop in energy. Figure 18 shows the STE of a 15 second speech sample,
encoded with G.711 and transmitted through a network with 5% packet loss. The
dots at the bottom are the actual packet losses and the ones above are the packet
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Figure 18: Packet Loss Prediction. The dots below show the actual losses and the
ones above are identified by our algorithm. The close correspondence between the
two indicates that we detect lost packets accurately.
losses identified by our detection mechanism. The close correspondence between the
two shows that our detection mechanism identifies packet loss accurately.
Figure 19 shows false positive and false negative cases for our detection mechanism.
In the top graph, a packet loss occurs at the start of a speech segment (7 seconds).
Since we classify packet losses based on an energy drop, floor and rise, such losses
are not detected. Note that this conservative approach reduces our false negatives at
the cost of potentially missing a small number of losses at the beginning and end of
speech. False negatives are shown in the bottom graph in Figure 19 at 3.2 seconds
and occur in the rare case when speech stops and starts in quick succession, with
the stop duration corresponding to a multiple of 80. This pattern occurs only when
there is a voiced “plosive,” or a stop sound in speech, such as the b sound in the word
“about.”
Each time a packet loss is detected, the length of the energy floor also reveals the
codec used in a particular VoIP network. Figure 20 shows the effect of packet loss
on two VoIP networks using different codecs: iLBC which encodes 30ms and Speex
which encodes 20 ms of speech per packet. The length of the energy floor is larger
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Figure 19: Scenarios showing a false negative (top at 7 seconds) and a false positive
(bottom at 3.2 seconds).




















Figure 20: Packet loss affect codecs differently. iLBC encodes 30 ms of audio per
packet and therefore a packet loss results in more audio lost in comparison to Speex
which encodes 20 ms of audio.
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for iLBC than Speex. In addition, since G.729 encodes 10 ms and G.711 encoded 20
ms per packet by default, the length of the energy floor is a good indication of the
codec used. We might identify the wrong codec when consecutive packets are dropped
as two consecutive packets dropped in a network using G.729 (10 ms audio) will be
similar to a single packet dropped in a network using G.711 (20 ms audio). However,
the probability of consecutive packets being dropped is lower that the probability of
a single dropped packet and we can identify the codec based on the most commonly
occurring energy floor length.
To summarize, short time energy provides a highly accurate mechanism to deter-
mine packet losses and the detection mechanism can also be used to identify the codec
used. Therefore, when a call traverses a potentially lossy VoIP network, the packet
loss rate and the codec used in that network can be extracted from the received audio.
5.1.1.2 Detecting Concealed Packet Loss
Some VoIP systems employ packet loss concealment (PLC) algorithms to prevent
short speech gaps from affecting call quality. Such concealment can be carried out
at the receiver (reactive) or with the assistance of the sender (proactive). In reac-
tive recovery, the lost packet is concealed either with silence, noise or is regenerated
by interpolating previously received packets. Proactive recovery algorithms include
redundant information such as the previous packet’s audio with each packet. This
approach incurs a bandwidth overhead and is rarely used. We focus on identifying
the effects of receiver side recovery algorithms on the audio and leave sender side
algorithms to future work.
When the concealment mechanism is silence or noise substitution, the STE-based
algorithm from the previous section can be used to detect packet losses by suitably ad-
justing the energy floor to correspond to the noise floor. Most VoIP codecs, however,
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Figure 21: The iLBC packet loss concealment detection algorithm. Because lost
packets are regenerated in a largely deterministic fashion from the residual and syn-
thesis filters of the previous packet, such packets can be detected by measuring the
correlation between the residuals of sequential packets.
to repeat a portion of the previous packet [151]. In codecs designed specifically for
VoIP such as iLBC or Speex, the concealment algorithm is more elaborate in order
to improve robustness to high packet loss rates. Fortunately, we observe that con-
cealment techniques are predominantly deterministic and a detection mechanism can
be created that exploits the correlation between reconstructed packets and previous
packets. We discuss the details of the PLC algorithm in iLBC to provide further
clarity.
iLBC uses a linear predictive coding (LPC) algorithm to represent speech in a
significantly compressed form. LPC is based on the source filter model of speech
production, where the larynx (source) produces sound energy, which when voiced
consists of a fundamental frequency (pitch) and its harmonics. This sound energy is
then shaped (synthesis filters) by the vocal tract (throat and mouth) into enhanced
frequency bands known as formants, which provide speech its intonation. The LPC
algorithm inverse-filters the formants from the speech signal to leave behind the orig-
inal sound energy, known as the residual. A codec like iLBC uses the residual, the
synthesis filters and dynamic codebook encoding to reduce the original speech into a
set of parameters which can be transmitted. The decoder uses these parameters to
reconstruct the residual and the synthesis filters which when combined re-synthesize
the speech. When a packet is lost, the decoder uses the residual from the previous
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Figure 22: The result of testing for the presence of highly correlated in-sequence
packets based on the iLBC packet loss concealment algorithm. The algorithm specif-
ically detects iLBC (solid blue lines) while remaining agnostic to other codecs such
as Speex (dotted green lines)
packet and creates a new pitch synchronous residual for the packet to be concealed.
Additionally, a random excitation is added to the new residual (non-deterministic
part). The new residual along with the synthesis filters from the previous packet are
used to create speech that will be substituted for the lost packet. Therefore the new
residual will be strongly correlated to the previous packet’s residual. To detect PLC
in iLBC we first split the received audio into packets containing 30 ms audio each (the
default for iLBC’s). We then create a pitch synchronous residual from each packet
and compare it to the residual extracted from the next packet. As these quantities
are generally not highly correlated, the detection of an association between sequen-
tial packets is a very strong indicator of iLBC’s packet loss concealment algorithm.
The packet loss concealment algorithms for the other codecs, though different, can
be detected based on how sequential packets are correlated.
Figure 21 shows a detailed block diagram for the iLBC PLC detection algorithm.
Since the encoding procedure in iLBC already extracts the residual from the audio,
we first split the audio into 30 ms chunks and apply the encoding steps defined in
Section 3.1 to 3.3 of iLBC RFC 2951 [75]. This includes running a high pass filter
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to remove noise in the audio, performing LPC analysis to extract the synthesis filters
and then using the synthesis filters along with the data to extract the residual, r. We
use r to generate a pitch synchronous residual r′ as defined in Section 4.5 of iLBC
RFC 2951. r′ will be strongly correlated to the residual from the next chunk of 30
ms of audio if that packet had been lost. We calculate r and r′ for each chunk and
report high correlations between as indications of PLC.
Figure 22 shows the correlation between residuals of a 15 second speech sample
encoded with the iLBC codec (solid blue lines) and transmitted through a VoIP
network with a loss rate of 10%. At each high correlation point (above 0.8) we confirm
from our logs that the particular packet was lost. To show that the PLC detection
algorithm is specific to iLBC, we run it on the same 15 second speech sample encoded
with Speex instead and transmitted through the 10% loss rate VoIP network. The
results are again shown in Figure 22 as the dashed green lines. Though packets were
lost in this case too, the detection algorithm does not show high correlation between
residuals, confirming that we can create PLC detection algorithms specific to the way
each codec conceals packets. Since all the codecs use different concealment strategies,
in addition to detecting concealed packet losses our algorithms also provide a strong
indication of the codec used in a particular VoIP network.
Finally, in Figure 22 we observe that for the 15 second sample encoded with iLBC,
54 out of the 501 packets (loss rate = 52
501
= 10.38%) were lost and we are only able
to identify 9 correlations. This is largely due to the fact that the PLC algorithm is
not completely deterministic (random excitation). However, the number of concealed
packets detected is still indicative of the loss rate. To show this, we ran our detection
algorithm over 15 seconds of 20 male and female American English speech samples
from the Open Speech Repository [164] encoded with iLBC and transmitted through
VoIP networks with 0, 1, 5 and 10% loss rates. The association between the number of
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Figure 23: Number of concealed packets detected with increasing loss rate in a 15s
speech sample. The median number of concealed packets detected by our algorithm
increases with increasing loss rate.
the median and the 25th and 75th percentiles with whiskers specified as .5 times the
interquartile range. We see that the median number of concealed packets increases
significantly as the loss rates increase. Therefore, the PLC detection algorithm can
make approximations of the loss rate but is not as accurate as the detection algorithm
for unconcealed packet losses.
Our packet loss and packet loss concealment detection algorithms identify three
aspects about the provenance of a call: (1) Whether the call traversed a VoIP network,
(2) the packet loss rate in that network and (3) the codec used in that network. (1)
identifies if there are VoIP networks in the path of a call and (2) and (3) characterize
the VoIP network.
5.1.2 Identifying PSTN and Cellular Networks Through Noise Profiling
Now that we are able to identify and characterize VoIP networks, we can look for
codec specific artifacts in the received audio to identify PSTN and cellular networks.
Waveform codecs like G.711 are used mostly in PSTN networks as they capture
speech without any compression and require much higher bandwidth (64 kbps) than




































Figure 24: The noise profile of G.711 is significantly different from other codecs,
allowing us to identify it when it is used in a network.
in a strong correlation between the noise and the signal. This is known as multiplica-
tive noise and its presence can be determined based on spectral statistic metrics:
spectral level range and the spectral level deviation. Furthermore, the spectral clar-
ity for such a codec, or the measured crispness of the audio, is very high. In contrast,
since cellular networks require efficient use of bandwidth they use high compression
codecs like GSM-FR (13 kbps). The spectral clarity of such codecs suffer due to the
significant compression. Spectral clarity quantifies the perceptible difference in call
quality that we experience when talking on a landline versus a mobile phone. Fig-
ure 24 shows the spectral clarity, the spectral level range and deviation for 20 male
and female American English speech samples from the Open Speech Repository [164]
encoded and decoded using the different codecs. We see that G.711 and GSM-FR
can be clearly identified. Once we identify the codec using these metrics we can do
a simple codec to network translation to determine if a call has traversed a PSTN
network or has originated from a cellular network. Furthermore these three metrics





























Figure 25: The PinDr0p call provenance extraction algorithm. After the applied
codecs have been detected, packet loss rates are compared against individual source
profiles. The resulting signature can be used to judge the provenance of an incoming
call.
5.1.3 Extracting Provenance Data
We have seen how packet loss and packet loss concealment detection identifies and
characterizes any traversed VoIP network. Similarly, the noise profiles identify and
characterize any PSTN and cellular network. Together, we can create fingerprints
that detail the provenance of a call.
Call provenance fingerprints consist of two parts: (1) the path traversal signature
and (2) detailed characterization of each network in the path traversal signature. The
path traversal signature identifies the networks that a call traversed and the codec
used. The characterization provides more details of each network. The features we
extract can be used towards both these parts as shown in Figure 25. To obtain the
path traversal signature we first train a multi-label classifier as shown in Figure 25
using a repository of speech samples. Each sample is subjected to codec transfor-
mations and network degradations depending on the networks it traverses (details in
Section 5.2). For each of the resulting audio samples, we first look for packet losses.
If present, we calculate the packet loss rate which forms the packet loss profile and
then add the extracted codec information and the rate (as G.711 with some loss rate
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Table 4: Call Traversal Scenarios.
Configuration Scenario # Simulated Samples
Single Network Traversal
PSTN - PSTN Plain old telephone call 20
Mobile - Mobile Short distance call b/w cell phones 20
VoIP - VoIP Unfederated call b/w VoIP clients e.g., Google Talk 60
Two Network Traversal
PSTN - Mobile Call b/w PSTN landline and cell phone 320
PSTN - VoIP Call b/w PSTN landline and VoIP client e.g., Skype-
Out
360
Mobile - VoIP Call b/w cell phone and VoIP client 560
Three Network Traversal
PSTN - VoIP - Mobile International call using calling cards 1200
PSTN - VoIP - PSTN Same as above 240
Mobile - VoIP - Mobile VoIP call bridging b/w two mobile phones e.g., Google
Talk
960
Mobile - PSTN - VoIP Call b/w mobile using a PSTN core network and a
VoIP client
400
Mobile - PSTN - Mobile Similar as above 80




indicates a VoIP network) to the feature vector. Next, we apply the correlation algo-
rithm to detect packet loss concealment. If the correlation algorithm finds concealed
losses, the corresponding codec is again added to the feature vector along with the
number of concealed packets (PLC profile). We then extract the noise profile for the
call audio and add the spectral metrics to the feature vector. Since the quality of
speech degrades with the number of networks traversed we also obtain call quality
metrics from a single ended quality tool, P.563 [152] and add this to the feature vector.
The multi-label classifier is then trained on each sample’s feature vector and label.
A sample has five labels, each indicating the presence or absence of a codec. For
example a speech sample in our repository that was encoded using GSM-FR (origi-
nated at a cellphone), then re-encoded using iLBC (traversed a VoIP network) and
finally re-encoded using G.711 (receiving end point is a landline) would have a ’1’ for
three labels (GSM-FR, iLBC and G.711) and a ’0’ for Speex and G.729. Multi-label
classifiers have been used significantly in text categorization [157, 108, 175] and we
use a set of standard reduction techniques to convert the multi-label data into a single
label model. The classifier then learns which features best predict the presence or
absence of a label.
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For any new call audio we perform the same procedure, but do not add any label as
the classifier will predict a set of labels based on the learned model. The prediction
of the classifier for the path traversal signature, along with packet loss, noise and
quality profiles, represents the call provenance fingerprint for a particular source in
PinDr0p.
5.1.4 Security Implications
The path traversal signature and the complete provenance fingerprint provide a useful
security framework in the absence of any verifiable metadata. The traversal signature
alone can be used against adversaries who are bound by operating constraints. For
example, adversaries trying to spoof a dedicated line to the bank might use VoIP due
to the fact that they can remain largely anonymous and can make a large number of
inexpensive calls. However, the path traversal signatures for these two calls will be
different. To address this, the adversary can switch to a landline, in which case he has
lost the ability to easily make a large number of calls and potentially compromised
his anonymity.
We can also use the complete provenance fingerprint against adversaries as it
also characterizes individual networks. Since this involves capturing detailed profiles
of these networks traversed, an adversary trying to spoof a call needs to be able
to match all these profiles. We show in Section 5.3 that our fingerprints are able
to discriminate between sources that are in the same city using the same provider,
demonstrating that matching an entire fingerprint is extremely difficult. Accordingly,
we believe our approach is a significant first step in creating suitable defenses against
a host of attacks possible in today’s diverse telephony infrastructure.
5.2 Evaluation
We evaluate our approach based on two metrics: (1) the accuracy of our multi-label
classifier in predicting the correct network traversal signature of a call and (2) the
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ability of our provenance fingerprint to consistently identify a call source. We discuss
the evaluation of the first in this section and analyze the second in the following
section.
5.2.1 Experimental Setup
We train and test the multi-label classifier against a repository of speech samples
that are subjected to a representative set of real-world call traversal scenarios and
network degradations. We assume calls can traverse one, two or three networks as
most call scenarios fall into one of these cases; however, our methodology can be
extended to deal with additional transcoding. Table 4 shows the considered call
traversal configurations. Single network traversals represent calls that are contained
within one system. For example, the VoIP-VoIP scenario occurs when two Skype users
call each other. Since both clients are connected to the Internet, they communicate
through a set of relays (supernodes) and the call stays completely within the IP
network. Two network traversals are calls from users on one telephony technology
to users on another. There are six possible combinations and for brevity we only list
three of them, in each case subsuming the symmetric traversal scenario (i.e., PSTN-
Mobile and Mobile-PSTN are categorized as a single scenario). Finally, three network
traversals occur when providers attempt to take advantage of the benefits offered by
each telephony technology. For instance, while calls between two Vonage clients
within the US can be completely VoIP-VoIP, Vonage specifically transmits the call
over the PSTN backbone due to its QoS guarantees. Similarly, most international
calling card services use VoIP across the Internet as this provides an inexpensive
calling alternative.
Our experiments use speech samples from the Open Speech Repository [164],
which contains samples of 20 different American English speakers, 10 male and 10
female, speaking phrases from the Harvard sentence list [13]. These samples are used
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for standardized testing of PSTN, VoIP and cellular systems as recommended by the
IEEE Recommended Practices for Speech Quality Measurements [20]. Each sample
is 40 seconds long, but we consider only the first 15 seconds, as call quality algorithms
such as P.563 typically use this length to determine call quality metrics.
We consider the most popular narrowband codecs for encoding calls in our exper-
iments. Specifically, we use G.711 for PSTN systems, G.711, G.729, iLBC and Speex
for VoIP systems, and GSM for cellular systems. Calls traversing two telephony net-
works (e.g., VoIP to cellular) are transcoded to the new codec.2 Since transcoding is
not always defined for a pair of codecs, we follow the common practice of converting to
and from an intermediate G.711 form. We use the PJSIP [117] suite of applications
to encode and perform the necessary conversions between codecs. PJSIP contains
open source SIP and media stacks and is part of the European Broadcasting Union
Audio over IP standard [66]. It supports G.711, iLBC, Speex and GSM. For G.729,
we integrate the Intel Integrated Performance Primitives Library [86] into PJSIP.
In addition to the codecs, each traversed network is characterized by its signal
degradation characteristics. VoIP networks experience packet losses which typically
increase in correlation with factors such as routing distances, “last-mile” unreliability,
network congestion and over-subscription. For VoIP networks, we simulate packet
loss rates of 1, 5 and 10%. For bit errors occurring from multi-path fading radio
channels in mobile networks, we use a GSM traffic channel simulator developed for
Simulink [107].
Experiments are conducted by taking one speech sample from the Open Speech
Repository and encoding it with the appropriate codec using PJSIP. Samples cor-
responding to packet losses or signal degradations found in the traversed telephony
network are also generated and tested (e.g., packet loss in iLBC, multi-path fading
2Recall that VoIP calls can cross multiple autonomous systems throughout the Internet without
being transcoded.
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Table 5: Accuracy of multi-label classifier using C 4.5 decision trees.























|Yi| 90.3% 89.3% 97%
in GSM). We also append the codec multi-label for each generated sample. We ag-
gregate all possible resulting speech samples into a corpus. The number of samples
for each of the traversal scenarios is shown in Table 4.
We run the feature extraction algorithms described in Section 5.1.3 on each of the
speech samples and then train and test a multi-label classifier on the resulting feature
vector and label. We use Mulan [153], an open source Java library for multi-label
learning, to create our machine learning classifier.
5.2.2 Classification Results
Multi-label classifiers can use a variety of reduction techniques including Binary Rele-
vance (BR), Label Power (LP) set and Random k-Labelsets (RAkEL) [158] to convert
the multi-label into a single label. The resulting labels can then be classified by any
of the traditional single-label classifiers. We use C4.5 decision trees as the underlying
single-label classifier as it outperforms other classifiers that we considered including
Naive Bayes and Neural Networks. Using the corpus described above, we use 10-fold
cross validation to measure the accuracy of the multi-label classifier under the three
reduction techniques. Our results are described in Table 5. We define the metrics as
specified in the multi-label classification literature [157]. Let the multi-label dataset
consist of |L| labels (five in our case) and |D| instances in the test set, with each
instance i represented by feature vector fi and label Yi. The classifier C makes label









Figure 26: We tested our system using multiple sources from four continents: North
America, Europe, Asia and Australia. Specifically, we recorded incoming calls from
five different PSTN phones in Atlanta, GA, Dallas, TX, and France; four different
mobile phones in Atlanta, GA, New York City, NY, San Jose, CA and London, UK; six
VoIP phones in Atlanta, GA (Skype and Vonage), Baltimore, MD(MajicJack), Pune,
India(MagicJack), Dubai, UAE(Vonage) and Melbourne, Australia (MyNetPhone).
traversal signature, the classifier predicts a label using only the feature vector. The
metrics defined help quantify the difference between the predicted and actual labels.
We find that RAkEL has the lowest Hamming loss and the highest accuracy of
91.6%. The results show that we are able to predict which networks a call traversed
with high accuracy. We also find that the majority of misclassifications occur for
samples that traversed a VoIP network with 0% packet loss rate.
5.3 Real-World Testing
The complete provenance fingerprint of a call consists of the path traversal signature,
and profiles for packet loss, concealment, noise and quality. If this fingerprint remains
consistent for a call source, it provides valuable metadata that can be used to identify
and distinguish different calls purely from the received audio. We asked different
users to make a set of 10 live calls to our testbed in Atlanta, GA from 16 different
locations around the world, including Australia, India, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom and France. The complete list of locations is shown in Figure 26.
















































































































































































































































































Figure 27: The confusion matrix for the live-captured call data trained with labels
for (a) one set of calls, (b) three sets of calls and (c) five sets of calls from all call
sources. The accuracy on even a singly labeled training set is 90% and quickly jumps
to 100% with 5 labeled training sets.
the received audio and then label all calls from a call source with the same unique
label. We then train a neural network classifier for N sets of the 10 call sets (set =
one call from each source). We vary N from one to five and then test with five new
call sets. This represents the scenario that a user labels a set of calls and expects
subsequent calls coming from the same source to be labeled correctly by our algorithm.
Our experiment evaluates the tradeoff between labeling effort and accuracy.
The results show that even if a single set of 16 calls is labeled, the remaining five
sets of calls from the 16 different locations are identified with the correct call source
label with 90% accuracy. The accuracy increases quickly to 96.25% for two, 97.5% for
three, 97.5% for four and 100% for five labeled sets. Figure 27 shows the confusion
matrix for 1, 3 and 5 training sets.
Even with a singly labeled training set (Fig 27(a)) we find that all VoIP calls
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are correctly identified as they are easily distinguishable from the other networks.
They are also distinguishable among themselves as they are geographically spread
across Atlanta, Maryland, Dubai, Pune and Australia and each has a different packet
loss concealment profile. In some cases we were pleasantly surprised by the actual
differentiator. We found that Vonage calls from Atlanta were distinguishable from
all the other VoIP calls based on its high spectral level range (noise profile) rather
than the packet loss profile. We suspect that this is due to the fact that Vonage calls
almost immediately transfer to the PSTN backbone for quality of service, while other
services predominantly use VoIP. However, we did not observe this in the international
Vonage call from Dubai where the call path would be predominantly VoIP, instead,
to make the call affordable.
Figure 27(a) shows that even with a singly labeled training set we are able to
distinguish between the three landlines from Atlanta, including the two from within
the Georgia Tech campus, demonstrating that even for similar call sources the char-
acteristics can be significantly different. We also see that three of the five calls from
the London mobile phone are misclassified as a mobile phone call from New York and
one call was misclassified as a landline call from France. The provenance of the call
from London seems to be misclassified based on either the distance similarity (both
coming from Europe) or the same origin network (cell). The number of misclassifica-
tions for the test set containing 80 calls (16 locations ×5) drops significantly from 10
to 3 and then to 2 with increasing the number of training sets. With five labeled call
sets being trained we have no misclassification showing that with each extra label the
classifier becomes increasingly accurate.
The profiles that we capture for each source are consistent for the same call source
but have enough variability to allow us to distinguish different call sources. Although
we still require 15 seconds of call audio before being able to identify the provenance,
we believe that an attempt to steal sensitive information (e.g., bank account numbers)
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from a potential victim requires significantly more time. Accordingly, users should
be sure to wait at least this amount of time before disclosing such information. We
plan to investigate the uniqueness of a larger number of call sources as part of future
work.
5.4 Discussion
In this section, we investigate some of the limitations of our current infrastructure
and discuss a number of future extensions that will both improve the accuracy of our
detection and its resistance to more active adversaries.
5.4.1 Limitations
Our call provenance infrastructure is designed to detect codecs and path character-
istics associated with a given source. In spite of its relative strength, there exist a
number of limitations associated with our current system. For instance, unlike Caller-
ID systems, our call provenance infrastructure requires that the receiver answer the
call before its source can be verified. This may not be useful to those using Caller-ID
as a means of deciding whether or not to take a call. This shortcoming could poten-
tially be addressed by pushing our mechanism into the cloud. Incoming calls could
potentially be forced to first interact with a recording, which could collect sufficient
audio for analysis, before reaching the intended target.
We currently rely heavily on packet loss characteristics of the path between sources
and our testbed to differentiate VoIP fingerprints. While instantaneous packet loss
rates certainly fluctuate, paths and their corresponding loss patterns are relatively
stable in the Internet [114]. However, we recognize that our packet loss profiles may
need to be more accepting of diurnal cycles and temporary anomalies and plan to
study such issues in the future.
As an implementation decision, we currently associate a source with a single fin-
gerprint. This assumption is appropriate when dealing with an immobile source such
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as a corporate calling center. However, individual users may take advantage of the
mobility allowed by VoIP software such as Skype to legitimately place calls from a
number of different locations. The advantage in such a scenario is that the receiver
is likely to recognize the caller’s voice and can therefore manually associate new fin-
gerprints to a particular source.
Lastly, we have attempted to analyze the most widely used codecs in our study.
However, other less widely use codecs were not considered in this initial study. For
instance, the Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR) codec, which provides higher audio quality
and is beginning to compete with GSM on mobile devices, and a handful of others
such as the Enhanced Variable Rate Codec (EVRC) for CDMA networks will be
considered as part of our future work.
5.4.2 Additional Applications
We have focused the work in this chapter on using call provenance to address Caller-
ID spoofing attacks. However, the utility of PinDr0p is not limited to this task. While
stories of VoIP-based phishing (vishing) have become popular in the media [168, 144],
the extent to which such calls are occurring compared to traditional telephony fraud
is unknown. The deployment of our infrastructure in a distributed fashion may help
to answer this question. In particular, the use of call provenance in this space can
assist in determining the prevalence and potentially the identity of individual vishing
campaigns. While we leave the details of such an infrastructure to future work, we
hope to be able to provide the security community with a tool for better understanding
such attacks.
PinDr0p may also be useful as a means of authenticating channels. For instance,
credit card and home security companies often use Caller-ID information as a second
factor of authentication when customers call with account questions. Such organiza-
tions could increase the number and difficulty of questions asked of the caller based
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on the measured provenance of the incoming call. In multi-factor authentication anal-
ysis, PinDr0p can be used to determine if information exchange through a website
and a phone call are truly independent. Finally, PinDr0p could also be used by law
enforcement agencies for call forensics.
5.5 Conclusion
Caller-ID has long been viewed as a reliable means of identifying the source of a
call. However, this mechanism is now easily spoofable through a variety of free and
low-cost techniques. In this paper, we take a first step towards a mechanism capable
of determining call provenance — the source and the path taken by a call. We
leverage attributes of the audio delivered to the receiver, including characteristics of
the applied codes, packet loss profiles and bit error rates. We use these measurable
elements to identify the codecs applied to incoming calls passing through as many
as three intermediary types of telephony networks with a 91.6% accuracy. Moreover,
fingerprints for specific sources were identified with between 90% and 100% accuracy
with one and five training sets, respectively. This demonstrates that PinDr0p makes
VoIP-based phishing attacks harder and provides an important first step towards a
Caller-ID alternative. In our quest to create effective identities, we extend this work
in the next chapter to obtain geographical information about a call.
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CHAPTER VI
LONDON CALLING: EXTENDING CALL PROVENANCE
TO DETECT GEOGRAPHY OF A CALLER
From Chapter 3, we realize that there are situations where we need more information
than just identity. In the absence of common signaling and the impracticality of
introducing elements within the telecommunication core, obtaining social network
linkages for calls that traverse through multiple networks is infeasible. From the
previous chapter we are encouraged by audio artifacts revealing the type of network
a call traverses through. We now look at extending call provenance to determine
the geography of a caller. Geography is attractive as it provides both organizations
and consumers vital information about the legitimacy of a call. Financial institutions
have expressed to us that geography can be used in conjunction with information
that they record to determine if a particular call is fraudulent. For example, knowing
that a customer call is coming from eastern Europe when a credit card transaction by
the same customer was recorded a couple of hours back at Atlanta, provides a strong
indication that the call is fraudulent. Towards determining geography, we need to
first identify artifacts that are specific to certain paths. We then use these artifacts
to see if we can group all calls coming over those paths. To understand why this is
possible we first look at the notion of timbre of sound.
6.1 Timbre of Call Path
Timbre refers to the texture that is introduced into sound as a result of being produced
by a specific sound production unit. For example, people with a keen ear are able to




Figure 28: Anomalies in timbre are due to the call path. We hypothesize this will
provide an indication of the path that a call takes.
Fender Stratocaster versus a Les Paul guitar. When a call goes over a certain path
we hypothesize that the path adds a certain timbre to the call that can be used to
identify geography. However, since a call is predominantly human voice, the voice
itself adds timbre to the call. Therefore timbre that cannot be added by a human
voice is essentially timbre created by the call path. We therefore look for anomalies in
the sound that could not have been created by a human voice and use that to profile
the call path as shown in Figure 28.
6.2 Identifying Anomalies in Timbre
Timbre in sound depends to a large extent on the envelope or how sound varies
over time and to some extent on the spectrum. Therefore, determining anomalies in
timbre is reduced down to identifying anomalies in the spectral envelope of the sound.
We use two techniques traditionally used in sound to capture the spectral envelope,
linear predictive coding and the cepstrum and we discuss these techniques in the next
sections.
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6.2.1 LPC and Cepstrum
We used LPC in chapter 6 to detect concealed packet losses in the iLBC codec.
LPC can be used to model the geometry of the vocal tract through the duration
of the call. In particular, we use it to model the back of the throat, the middle of
the throat and the mouth. Since these are controlled by human muscles they can
(1) only take on certain shapes, e.g. the mouth can only be stretched to a certain
extent, and (2) the geometry can only have a certain rate of change, e.g. the throat
cannot be wide at one instant and constricted in the next instant. We look for
anomalies in the geometry, namely, excessively large sizes for the tracts or excessively
fast changes in the geometry. Since these can not be caused by human voice they
are artifacts introduced by the path. Similar to the LPC, another technique used to
detect excessively fast variations is the cepstrum which produces information about
the rate of change of different spectrum bands. In essence we use both LPC and
cepstrum to profile call paths.
6.2.2 Identifying Anomalies in Vocal Tract Using LPC
LPC is based on the source filter model of speech production, where the larynx
(source) produces sound energy, which when voiced consists of a fundamental fre-
quency (pitch) and its harmonics. This sound energy is then shaped (synthesis fil-
ters) by the vocal tract (throat and mouth) into enhanced frequency bands known
as formants, which provide speech its intonation. For unvoiced speech, there is no
fundamental frequency. Voiced speech is the sound produced when uttering a vowel
while unvoiced speech corresponds to consonants. Therefore, LPC considers voiced
and unvoiced segments separately when analyzing and synthesizing speech. The basic
model of operation for LPC is that it considers a block of speech, decides whether it is
voiced or unvoiced and then decides the pith and the synthesis filters as parameters.
For voiced segment, to determine the pitch we use the average magnitude difference
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function (AMDF) as proposed in government standard 1014, also known as LPC-10.
For determining the filter coefficients, the LPC estimates the current sample se(t) at
time t by p previous samples as se(t) =
∑p
i=1 ais(t − i), where ai is the filter coeffi-
cient. These coefficients are chosen to minimize the difference between the estimated
value of the sample and the true value of the sample. These coefficients then give an
accurate representation of the shape of the vocal tract.
The quantization of filter coefficients creates a major problem since errors in the
filter coefficients can lead to instability in the final vocal tract filter and an inaccurate
output signal. Instead, we use the Levinson-Durbin algorithm to generate reflection
coefficients that can be used to rebuild the filter coefficients. From the reflection coef-
ficients, we can then derive the uniform cross-sectional areas of the different elements
of the vocal tract. This allows us to model the back of the throat, the middle of the
throat and the mouth for each segment of speech. Based on well defined models of
speech production there are threshold values for how large these areas can be and
what are possible configurations. We use these values to determine if there are vi-
olations of these thresholds or infeasible configurations. We also look at vocal tract
variations from one block of speech to the next and see if there are any unnaturally
quick variations. Both of these are essentially the anomalies in the the vocal tract that
must have been created by the path and the number and nature of such anomalies
becomes a profile for the path that is producing them.
6.3 Evaluation
To evaluate PinDr0p we had asked family and friends, of the coauthors of that paper,
located all over the world to make a large number of calls to our testbed in Atlanta.
This approach was cumbersome and labor intensive. To avoid this, we instead decided
to capture path profiles by making calls (instead of receiving) to different phone
numbers across the world. The audio stream coming from the call recipient to us (the
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caller) is still traveling the call path and will still contain all the artifacts introduced
by this path. We can then measure how well anomalies detected by the LPC and the
cepstrum can be used to profile certain geographies. We therefore made calls from our
phone testbed in Atlanta, Georgia to 10 countries which include Philippines, Mexico,
Japan, Canada, Venezuala, Russia, South Africa, Australia and Great Britain.
To ensure that there were no humans being bothered by these calls, we made
calls to customer service numbers with IVR systems. The customer service numbers
were scraped from a variety of Internet sources which include customerservicenum-
bers.com, the yellow pages, government, banking and transportation organizations of
each of these countries. We looked at the length of the message and used that as
an approximation as to whether we reached an IVR or a human. In our experience,
if the call reached a human, they would hang up the phone immediately while an
IVR would mindlessly continue providing a set of options. Though we can use more
rigorous techniques to determine if we reached an IVR or a human (ask the recipient
to press a DTMF tone if they have received the call in error), we found this technique
to be quick and effective. We identified 9 customer service numbers in each country
and made 10 calls to each of these numbers resulting in 10 phone calls/number * 9
numbers/country * 9 countries = 810 calls. Out of these, only 751 calls were actually
placed as certain calls were not completed (e.g. the line being busy). To ensure that
these calls were actually going to the right country, we did not call any numbers
that were toll free as these numbers are typically forwarded to some other number
potentially not in the same country. All numbers scraped had area codes specific to
that country. In each call we recorded 30 seconds of IVR audio and ran algorithms
to detect anomalies in the LPC and cepstrum and then determined the extent and
distribution of these anomalies. We then labeled all calls with the country that was
being called and used a 10 fold cross validated neural network classifier to see if we
can identify a country from the call provenance profile.
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Figure 29: Confusion matrix for geography detection. Each country is represented by
its two letter country code. Canada has the highest true positive rate while Australia
has the lowest
6.4 Timbre of Call Path
The confusion matrix is as shown in Figure 29. 630 of the 751 calls are correctly
classified providing an accuracy of 83.9%. As seen, certain countries are classified
more accurately than others. For example, Canada has the highest true positive
rate of 91% while Australia has the lowest true positive rate of 70.8%. Even more
interesting are the misclassifications. We find Philippines is most often misclassified
as Japan, while Russia is most often misclassified as Great Britain and Australia is
misclassified as both Japan and South Africa. To understand these misclassifications,
we further investigated the paths taken by these calls and looked at the undersea
telecommunication cables between the US and other countries as shown in Figure 30.
We find that 3 out of the 4 undersea cables from Phillipines pass through Japan in
order to come to the US. Our calls to Russia were predominantly to West Russia
whose telecommunication access to the US is through Great Britain, again explaining
these misclassifications. Since we called both west and east Australia, these two
regions take completely different routes to the US with cables going through Japan,
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Figure 30: Undersea cables between the US and other countries. Though not shown,
the cables travel across either the Atlantic or the Pacific to reach the US.
Great Britain and South Africa. However the undersea cables do not explain some of
the other misclassifications, like Mexico being misclassified as Great Britain. As part
of future work, we are investigating these to see what other effects are in place.
We further tried grouping countries into continents: Phillipines and Japan into
Asia, Canada, Venezuala and Mexico into America, Great Britain and Russia into
Europe and South Africa as Africa and used a neural network to predict the continent
using 10 fold cross validation. We find we are able to classify 618 of the 679 calls
correctly (we did not consider Australia) giving us an accuracy of 91%. This is
because many of the misclassifications that arose due to common undersea cable
from continents can be avoided. As part of future work we would like to see if we
can use clustering algorithms to automatically determine a tradeoff between size of
region and desired accuracy.
6.5 Conclusion
There are artifacts in call audio that can help us estimate the geography of a call.
We used LPC and cepstrum to detect anomalies in timbre due to the call paths and
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achieved an accuracy of over 83%. This provides additional information to determine
if a call will result in a desirable interaction or not.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The thesis hypothesized that it was possible to create effective identities in a con-
verged telecommunication landscape that reduced both VoIP spam and Caller ID
spoofing. We also wanted to determine that additional information shared to create
these effective identities were privacy preserving. Towards the creation of effective
identities to combat threats that undermine trust in telephony, we explored multiple
techniques to determine if a call would lead to a desirable interaction. This thesis
makes the following contributions:
• CallRank: We proposed CallRank, a system that uses call duration in com-
bination with social network linkages and a global reputation to determine if
a user is a spammer or not. In particular, we introduced call duration based
credentials as the uniform underlying mechanism to determine if a caller is a
spammer. We then explored the use of SNs based on the call credentials to allow
two users to make a call. When SN linkages are unavailable between users, we
used a variation of the Eigentrust algorithm to assign global reputations based
on call durations. We finally performed a detailed evaluation of CallRank and
show that we are able to achieve low false negative and low false positive rates
even in the presence of a significant fraction of spammers.
• Privacy Preserving Grapevines: Though CallRank was effective in dealing
with VoIP spam it shared sensitive information to prove the existence of a so-
cial network path. To address this limitation, we created Privacy Preserving
Grapevines which proves the existence of a social network path without reveal-
ing the participants of that path. Specifically, we identified the requirements
108
for a framework that allows a new user, Bob, to prove the existence of SN call
path between him and Alice, without revealing the actual path. In addition, the
framework allows us to capture Alice’s willingness to continue communicating
with Bob. We then created a transferable single use token mechanism that ex-
tends delegatable anonymous credentials[36] with techniques from E-Cash[47]
to realize this framework. We implemented this framework using the PBC li-
brary and experimentally evaluated the costs associated with its operations.
Finally, we applied this framework to a VoIP setting and demonstrated that it
can combat the spam problem with low false positive and false negative rates.
CallRank and the privacy preserving extension to it show that within VoIP sys-
tems we can create effective identities that are able to reduce VoIP spam while
ensuring the privacy of the users of the system.
• Call Provenance: We then broadened our focus and considered the entire
telecommunication landscape. Here we observe that Caller-ID has long been
viewed as a reliable means of identifying the source of a call. However, this
mechanism is now easily spoofable through a variety of free and low-cost tech-
niques. To address this we created mechanisms capable of determining call
provenance — the source and the path taken by a call. In particular, we showed
that the received call audio provides extractable features that are strong iden-
tifiers of the networks that the call has traversed, allowing us to determine the
provenance of a call. These include degradations (packet loss in VoIP) and noise
characteristics of codecs unique to each network. We developed a multi-label
machine learning classifier based on the extracted features to correctly iden-
tify the provenance of an incoming call with 91.6% accuracy with as little as
15 seconds of audio. Because PinDr0p does not rely on metadata available in
some networks (e.g., VoIP) or cryptography, it is more readily deployable across
the diverse devices and networks that make up modern telephony systems. We
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made calls using PSTN phones, cellular phones, Vonage, Skype and other soft
phones from locations across the world and are able to distinguish between them
with 90% accuracy with only a small sample being labeled. As we increase the
number of such labels we are able to distinguish between these calls with 100%
accuracy. This demonstrates that PinDr0p makes VoIP-based phishing attacks
harder and provides an important first step towards a Caller-ID alternative. In
addition to identity, we then extend provenance to obtain additional informa-
tion in the form of geography of a call. Though not as powerful as identifying
the social network linkages, this information is useful for financial institutions
to determine the likelihood of a call to be coming from one of their customers.
For example, this geography information can raise a flag when a user who has
recently bought an item with a credit card in Atlanta, GA and a couple of
hours later calls from a location across the Atlantic. This shows how effective
identities can be use in the broader context of preventing Caller ID spoofing
and even detecting potentially fraudulent calls.
7.1 Future Work
Through this thesis we have created effective identities in both VoIP networks and
across the broader telecommunication landscape. This has opened up a large number
of future avenues that we can pursue. These include:
• Improvements to systems created: Within Privacy Preserving Grapevines
we found that we could only accommodate users four hops away as beyond that
call setup times become unreasonable. We need to explore information available
from real social networks to determine how often do people get introduced to
users who are more that four hops away and what is the likelihood of spammers
breaking such systems. Within PinDr0p we can improve the robustness of the
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system through a number of extensions. While admittedly difficult, an adver-
sary capable of replicating all of the codecs and path characteristics associated
with the path between a legitimate source and target receiver would potentially
be able to be identified as the profiled source. This process not only implies that
the adversary has correctly guessed all of the codecs applied by intermediary
hops, but that they can ensure that their traffic exhibits similar packet loss, bit
error and noise characteristics as a legitimate connection. This is exceptionally
difficult as an adversary, for example, can not decrease the packet loss char-
acteristics of an intermediary network that they do not control. Our approach
therefore represents a significant improvement over the current state of the art.
While we currently detect the presence of as many as three different codecs
applied to audio, our mechanisms do not uncover the order in which the codecs
were applied. Determining codec order is an extremely difficult problem on
the surface. Knowledge of this ordering will make spoofing attempts by an
adversary located off the path more difficult.
Finally, we are interested in extending our analysis to include a larger number
of intermediary networks. While highly uncommon, it is possible that some
international calls may be transcoded by as many as five different codecs while
in flight between their source and destination. The repeated decoding and
encoding of audio information drastically reduces its quality at the receiver end
of the call and may also obscure the presence of the intermediary networks given
the elevated noise levels present in the sample.
• Identifying other categories of contextual information to create ef-
fective identities: Within VoIP systems we used social network linkages and
global reputation to provide additional information and within the telecom-
munication networks we used network type and geography. We would like to
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explore other categories of contextual information that can be used to determine
whether a call is beneficial or potentially malicious. We know that there are a
large number of instances where people meet at conferences or classrooms and
exchange phone numbers. In such cases there are potentially no social network
linkages and yet calls initiated after such a meeting are legitimate. Capturing
such social interactions would be extremely useful. One way to do this is to
extend the system to consider cross channel information. For example all con-
ference attendees can be considered a group and potential email interactions
that register a user into a conference can be used to detect group member-
ship. Therefore, we can use prior information from email interactions, create
credentials out of these interaction and use them to determine the legitimacy
of a subsequent call. In addition, we would like to explore other contextual
information that can be extracted purely from call audio such as the actual
telecommunication device (e.g., Skype softphone versus IPhone) being used in
a call.
• Effective identities in social networks: We believe that the benefits of
effective identities are not restricted to telecommunication systems. Our notion
of identifying a metric that truly captures interactions between users (e.g., call
duration in CallRank) and using that to determine the legitimacy of a call can
be applied to parallel systems. For example, within Twitter we have looked at
using Twitter specific conversation constructs such as @-mentions and retweets
to identify legitimate users from noise makers/spammers. We would like to
further explore the use of effective identities in such systems.
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[70] Foster, I. T., Vöckler, J.-S., Wilde, M., and Zhao, Y., “Chimera: AVir-
tual Data System for Representing, Querying, and Automating Data Deriva-
tion,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Scientific and Statisti-
cal Database Management (SSDBM), 2002.
[71] Franklin, J., McCoy, D., Tabriz, P., Neagoe, V., Randwyk, J. V.,
and Sicker, D., “Passive Data Link Layer 802.11 Wireless Device Driver Fin-
gerprinting,” in Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium (SECURITY),
2006.
[72] FreeCallerIDSpoofing.com, “Free Caller ID Spoofing - Caller ID Changer
- How to Make any Number You Want Show up on a Caller ID.” http://
freecalleridspoofing.com/, 2010. Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
[73] Fuchsbauer, G., Pointcheval, D., and Vergnaud, D., “Transfer-
able anonymous constant-size fair e-cash.” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2009/146, 2009. Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
[74] Ghanbari, M., Standard Codecs: Image Compression to Advanced Video Cod-
ing. The Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2003.
[75] Global IP Solutions, “The Internet Low Bitrate Codec (ILBC).” http:
//tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3951, 2004. Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
[76] Golub, G. H. and Van Loan, C. F., Matrix Computations (Johns Hop-
kins Studies in Mathematical Sciences). The Johns Hopkins University Press,
October 1996.
[77] Granovetter, M., “The strength of weak ties: A network theory revisited,”
Sociological Theory, vol. 1, pp. 201–233, 1983.
[78] Groth, J. and Sahai, A., “Efficient non-interactive proof systems for bilinear
groups,” in Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2008, pp. 415–432, 2008.
[79] Groth, P., Moreau, L., and Luck, M., “Formalising a Protocol for Record-
ing Provenance in Grids,” in Proceedings of the UK OST e-Science Third All
Hands Meeting 2004 (AHM’04), 2004.
[80] GSM, “GSM-FR: GSM Full Rate (GSM 06.10).” http://www.3gpp.org/FTP/
Specs/html-info/0610.htm, 1995. Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
118
[81] Hamadeh, I. and Kesidis, G., “A Taxonomy of Internet Traceback,” Inter-
national Journal of Secururity and Networks, vol. 1, no. 1/2, pp. 54–61, 2006.
[82] Hansen, M., Hansen, M., Mller, J., Rohwer, T., Tolkmit, C., and
Waack, H., “Developing a legally compliant reachability management system
as a countermeasure against spit,” in Proceedings of Third Annual VoIP Security
Workshop, (Berlin, Germany), Jun 2006.
[83] Hansen, T., Crocker, D., and Hallam-Baker, P., “Domainkeys identi-
fied mail (dkim) message signing service overview,” Mar 2007. IETF-DRAFT
draft-ietf-dkim-overview-04.txt.
[84] Hausheer, D., PeerMart: Secure Decentralized Pricing and Accounting for
Peer-to-Peer Systems. PhD thesis, ETH Zurich, Aachen, Germany, Mar. 2006.
[85] Houmansadr, A., Kiyavash, N., and Borisov, N., “RAINBOW: A Robust
And Invisible Non-Blind Watermark for Network Flows,” in Proceedings of the
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2009.
[86] Intel, “Intel Integrated Performance Primitives Library.” http://software.
intel.com/en-us/intel-ipp/. Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
[87] Ioannidis, J., Ioannidis, S., Keromytis, A. D., and Prevelakis, V.,
“Fileteller: Paying and getting paid for file storage,” in Sixth International
Conference on Financial Cryptography, pp. 282–299, 2002.
[88] Jagadish, H. V. and Olken, F., “Database Management for Life Sciences
Research,” ACM SIGMOD Record, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 15–20, 2004.
[89] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and Watson, M., “Private extensions to the
session initiation protocol (sip) for asserted identity within trusted networks,”
2002.
[90] JK Audio - Telephone Audio Interface Products, “THAT-1: Tele-
phone Handset Audio Tap.” http://www.jkaudio.com/that-1.htm, 2009.
Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
[91] Joachims, T., “Text Categorization with Support Vector Machines: Learning
with Many Relevant Features,” 1997.
[92] Justin Pritchard, “Credit Card Fraud - Credit Card Phone Acti-
vation Scam.” http://banking.about.com/od/securityandsafety/a/
creditcardfraud.htm. Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
[93] Kamvar, S. D., Schlosser, M. T., and Garcia-Molina, H., “The eigen-
trust algorithm for reputation management in p2p networks,” in Proc. 12th
International World Wide Web Conference, (Budapest, Hungary), May 2003.
119
[94] Kawamoto, D., “SEC Filing Acknowledges ’Pretex-
ting’ in HP Board Probe.” http://news.cnet.com/
SEC-filing-acknowledges-pretexting-in-HP-board-probe/2100-1014_
3-6112710.html, 2006. Last accessed Sep 18, 2009.
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